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A ROADMAP FOR FOREIGN OFFICIAL 
IMMUNITY CASES IN U.S. COURTS 
William S. Dodge* & Chimène I. Keitner** 
 
This Article provides a roadmap for cases involving foreign official 
immunity in U.S. courts.  In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Samantar 
v. Yousuf that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not govern 
the immunity of foreign officials.  Since Samantar, dozens of decisions have 
addressed questions of foreign official immunity.  Yet, U.S. courts often seem 
lost.  They frequently fail to engage with the customary international law 
rules of foreign official immunity, instead reaching back to an outdated 
provision of the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law.  
Courts are divided on how much deference to give the executive branch when 
it suggests immunity or nonimmunity in a particular case.  They are even 
unsure of which procedural rules to apply.  For example, courts continue to 
treat foreign official immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, 
following a path worn by the FSIA, even though Samantar clearly held that 
the FSIA does not apply to natural persons. 
This Article makes three distinct contributions.  First, it provides a concise 
overview of the international law rules that govern foreign official immunity 
and explains why courts should resist the temptation to expand the federal 
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common law of immunity beyond what international law clearly requires.  
Second, it contributes to the literature on deference to the executive in foreign 
affairs by examining the deference owed to executive suggestions of foreign 
official immunity or nonimmunity.  Third, it addresses a series of critical 
procedural questions that have so far received no academic attention, 
arguing among other things that foreign official immunity should be treated 
not as a question of subject matter jurisdiction but rather as an affirmative 
defense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than a decade ago, Samantar v. Yousuf1 tore up the map that many 
courts had been following in foreign official immunity cases.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19762 
(FSIA), which governs civil proceedings against foreign states and their 
agencies and instrumentalities, does not apply to foreign officials.3  Instead, 
 
 1. 560 U.S. 305 (2010). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
 3. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325. 
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the immunity of foreign officials “is properly governed by the common 
law.”4  But the Court provided no guidance on the common law’s substance 
or where courts should look to find it.5 
Making federal common-law rules6 is supposed to be a limited enterprise 
after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.7  International law has rules on foreign 
official immunity that U.S. courts can follow,8 but courts lack guidance on 
whether they should develop rules of foreign official immunity that go 
beyond what international law clearly requires.9  The executive branch 
claims that only the U.S. Department of State is entitled to make rules of 
foreign official immunity and that courts are bound to follow both the rules 
it articulates and its immunity determinations in particular cases.  These 
assertions raise substantial separation of powers concerns.10 
Since Samantar, dozens of decisions have grappled with a host of 
substantive and procedural questions in proceedings against current and 
former foreign officials.  Recent foreign official immunity cases have 
involved claims against the director of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo’s intelligence agency for the alleged torture of a U.S. citizen11 and 
claims against Israel’s former defense minister for the alleged extrajudicial 
killing of a Turkish citizen.12  At the time of writing, Saudi Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman, widely known as MBS, faced two lawsuits in U.S. 
courts:  one brought by the fiancée of Washington Post journalist Jamal 
Khashoggi for his extrajudicial killing in a Saudi consulate in Turkey and the 
other by a former Saudi senior intelligence official who alleges that MBS 
attempted to assassinate him in Canada.13 
U.S. courts require guidance on how to navigate this terrain.14  At present, 
many of them seem lost.  They frequently fail to engage with customary 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 321 n.15 (expressing “no view” on whether section 66 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law correctly reflects the common law of foreign official 
immunity). 
 6. See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts:  The 
Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 964 (2011) (noting that “[v]irtually 
every theorist to specifically consider foreign state or official immunity has favored 
application of some form of federal common law over state law”). 
 7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Rodriguez v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713, 717 (2020) (“Judicial 
lawmaking in the form of federal common law plays a necessarily modest role under a 
Constitution that vests the federal government’s ‘legislative Powers’ in Congress and reserves 
most other regulatory authority to the States.”). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. For further discussion of this question, see infra notes 108–21 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 156 (2020). 
 12. Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 13. Eleanor Runde, Saudi Crown Prince Facing Lawsuits in D.C., LAWFARE  
(Dec. 8, 2020, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/saudi-crown-prince-facing-lawsuits-
dc [https://perma.cc/FT7T-3LX7]. 
 14. See Curtis A. Bradley, Conflicting Approaches to the U.S. Common Law of Foreign 
Official Immunity, 115 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2021) (noting that “lower federal courts in the 
United States have struggled to develop a common law immunity regime to govern suits 
brought against foreign government officials”).  Bradley focuses on the interpretation of 
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international law rules of foreign official immunity and have instead relied 
on an outdated and inapposite provision of the American Law Institute’s 
1965 Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law.15  Courts are divided 
on how much deference to give the executive branch when it suggests 
immunity or nonimmunity in a particular case.16  They are even unsure of 
which procedural rules to apply.  For example, courts continue to treat 
foreign official immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, 
following a path worn by the FSIA, even though Samantar clearly held that 
the FSIA does not apply to foreign officials.17  Habitual reliance on the 
FSIA’s framework in cases that it was never intended to govern has created 
procedural confusion and incoherent results. 
This Article provides an essential roadmap for courts faced with claims 
against foreign officials who argue that the claims should be dismissed 
because of the positions they hold or because they acted in an official 
capacity.  In so doing, the Article makes three distinct contributions.  First, it 
provides a concise overview of the international law rules that govern foreign 
official immunity and explains why courts should resist the temptation to 
expand the federal common law of immunity beyond what international law 
clearly requires.18  Second, it contributes to the literature on deference to the 
executive in foreign affairs by examining the deference owed to executive 
suggestions of foreign official immunity or nonimmunity.19  Third, it 
addresses a series of critical procedural questions that have so far received 
no academic attention, arguing among other things that foreign official 
immunity should be treated not as a question of subject matter jurisdiction 
but rather as an affirmative defense.20  This carries implications for the way 
in which foreign official immunity defenses should be pleaded and proven. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I briefly recounts the history of 
foreign official immunity from the early days of the republic through 
Samantar.  The common-law tradition draws its strength from the 
development of doctrine through accumulated judicial practice.  Unearthing 
the roots of foreign official immunity doctrines allows us to better understand 
its later growth.  As early as the eighteenth century, U.S. courts treated 
diplomatic immunity as a privilege that shielded designated foreign officials 
from the exercise of domestic judicial power, whereas all other foreign 
 
section 66(f) of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law. Id. at 11–16.  We argue 
that this provision became superfluous following the enactment of the FSIA. See infra notes 
96–98 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Doğan, 932 F.3d at 893–94; Lewis, 918 F.3d at 146–47.  But see Yousuf v. 
Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773–77 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing customary international law at 
length). 
 16. Compare Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009) (deferring to State 
Department determination), with Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773 (holding that State Department 
determination “is not controlling, but it carries substantial weight”). 
 17. See, e.g., Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Isr., 919 F.3d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 2019); Lewis, 
918 F.3d at 145. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
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officials were subject to suit but could raise the fact that they had acted in an 
official capacity as an affirmative defense.  The executive branch could file 
a suggestion of immunity certifying the defendant’s status as beyond the 
reach of U.S. judicial process.  Resort to this procedure became more 
common as the nineteenth century saw an increasing number of in rem 
proceedings against foreign ships in U.S. ports.  In the 1940s, against the 
backdrop of the Second World War, the Supreme Court held that courts 
should defer to the executive branch’s suggestions of immunity for foreign 
ships and surrender in rem jurisdiction (the equivalent of personal 
jurisdiction for ships) if the executive said they should.  As a general matter, 
the executive branch suggested immunity for foreign ships that were owned 
and possessed by foreign governments but not for commercial vessels. 
The restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity holds that a foreign 
sovereign can properly be subject to another country’s domestic jurisdiction 
when it acts like a private person.  The executive branch officially adopted 
the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity in 1952, while 
disavowing the ability for such an executive policy to bind the courts.  The 
State Department established a procedure for deciding whether to suggest 
immunity for a particular defendant at the request of a foreign government, 
but only a few such requests involved foreign officials.  In 1976, the FSIA 
superseded the State Department’s process with respect to the immunity of 
foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities.  Some courts applied 
the FSIA to foreign officials too, but Samantar held in 2010 that foreign 
official immunity is governed by federal common law. 
Part II describes the law of foreign official immunity today, including 
head-of-state immunity, diplomatic and consular immunity, and 
conduct-based immunity.  Under customary international law, heads of state, 
heads of government, and foreign ministers are absolutely immune from suit 
in U.S. courts while they remain in office.21  The immunities of diplomats 
and consuls are codified in two treaties.22  Other officials, and all former 
officials, are entitled to conduct-based immunity for acts taken in their 
“official capacity,” a question that turns on the scope of their authority under 
foreign law and on whether international law requires immunity for acts of 
the kind alleged.23  Part II argues on separation of powers grounds that, 
absent a controlling statute, U.S. courts should apply the international law 
rules of foreign official immunity and should resist the temptation to expand 
that immunity beyond what international law clearly requires.24 
Part III takes up the question of deference to the executive branch.  In 
recent years, the State Department has claimed authority to make binding 
 
 21. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 
2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14); see also infra Part II.A.  Head-of-state immunity does not extend to 
crown princes. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 22. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 
U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter VCDR]; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 
21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]; see also infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
 24. See infra notes 108–21 and accompanying text. 
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determinations of foreign official immunity in individual cases and to 
articulate principles of foreign official immunity that courts are bound to 
follow in other cases.  These claims go beyond what the U.S. Constitution 
permits.  For status-based immunity, the executive has constitutional 
authority to determine which officials hold the relevant offices, and 
immunity flows as a matter of course from that determination.  But the 
executive has no similar constitutional authority to make determinations of 
conduct-based immunity, and allowing the executive to direct the outcome 
of individual cases raises serious separation of powers concerns.  The 
executive also lacks lawmaking power to establish principles of foreign 
official immunity that are binding on courts.  The State Department’s 
interpretations of treaties and the customary international law governing 
foreign official immunity should be given substantial weight, especially 
where the executive explains the basis for its conclusions.  Ultimately, 
however, the federal common law of immunity is for federal courts to 
develop, just like any other body of federal common law. 
Part IV considers a series of important procedural questions and provides 
courts with concrete guidance about how to proceed in cases that raise 
questions of foreign official immunity.  To begin, the FSIA’s provisions do 
not apply after Samantar, which means that the same rules of service, 
personal jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction apply in suits against 
foreign officials as apply in suits against other foreign, nonstate defendants. 
Part IV.B argues for a substantial change in how courts deal with pleading 
foreign official immunity.  The FSIA’s peculiar linkage of immunity to 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction has no bearing on the question in 
suits against foreign officials.  Thus, although most courts today treat foreign 
official immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, this Article 
argues that they should treat it instead as an affirmative defense, just as 
conduct-based immunity was treated in the early republic.  As a practical 
matter, treatment as an affirmative defense makes sense of some key aspects 
of foreign official immunity, such as the fact that it binds state as well as 
federal courts and the fact that it can be waived.  Such treatment would still 
permit foreign official immunity to be decided as a threshold question at the 
outset of the proceedings because the affirmative defense may be raised by 
motion before filing an answer.  If an official defaults or waives immunity 
without the consent of her state, federal courts can use Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) to provide relief from judgment on immunity grounds. 
Proving foreign official immunity raises a number of issues.  Part IV.C 
argues that the burden of proof should be on the foreign official, as it is with 
any affirmative defense. Statements by a foreign state that its official was 
acting in an official capacity should be given respectful consideration but are 
not binding on U.S. courts.  Sometimes foreign official immunity will turn 
on disputed facts, and courts may order limited discovery to determine the 
facts necessary to decide the immunity question. 
When the immunity question appears more difficult than other grounds for 
dismissal, a court should consider dismissing on alternative grounds.  If 
foreign official immunity is treated as an affirmative defense, the court will 
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be required to address personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction 
before reaching immunity in any event.  Lack of personal jurisdiction will 
often be an alternative ground for dismissal, unless the cause of action arose 
in the United States or the defendant was personally served with process in 
the United States.  If foreign official immunity is treated as an affirmative 
defense, the court would have the additional option of dismissing on the 
ground that the plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief.  For 
complaints that consist largely of conclusory allegations, this may be a better 
way to dispose of the case. International law is agnostic about the precise 
doctrinal basis for a dismissal on threshold grounds.  Failure to state a claim 
thus presents an attractive way to dismiss far-fetched claims against foreign 
officials without broadening the scope of federal common law to shield 
conduct that, if properly alleged, would not be entitled to immunity under 
international law. 
Finally, if a court reaches the question of immunity, both the grant and 
denial of foreign official immunity should be immediately appealable to 
spare the official from having to litigate liability before the immunity claim 
is resolved definitively.  This is how the qualified immunity of domestic 
officials is treated, despite its status as an affirmative defense. 
In sum, U.S. courts should decide questions of foreign official immunity 
by applying relevant statutes and rules of federal common law, which should 
not grant more immunity than customary international law clearly requires.  
Courts should give substantial deference to the State Department’s 
interpretations of international law, but they are not bound to follow either 
the State Department’s determinations of immunity in individual cases or its 
articulations of general principles.  Foreign official immunity should be 
treated as an affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the defendant.  
But it must also be treated as a threshold question and one that is immediately 
appealable to spare officials who are entitled to immunity from the burdens 
of litigation. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
Claimants have filed civil actions against current and former foreign 
officials since the beginning of the republic.25  In the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, claims against foreign officials often arose in 
connection with disputes about the ownership of vessels and their cargos.  In 
addition to bringing proceedings in rem against ships that entered U.S. ports, 
claimants sometimes secured writs of capias authorizing the sheriff to arrest 
individual foreign defendants in order to compel them to respond to civil 
suits.  This created diplomatic tensions when the arrested individuals sought 
assistance from their home states. 
Courts dealt with different kinds of immunity arguments differently.  They 
treated diplomatic immunity as a privilege that shielded designated foreign 
 
 25. For an overview of early cases, see Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of 
Foreign Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704 (2012). 
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officials from any form of domestic judicial process.  Any other foreign 
officials had to plead as an affirmative defense that they did not bear personal 
responsibility for the challenged acts and that only the foreign state itself was 
liable.26  In other words, courts treated the argument that a particular claim 
against a foreign official could not properly be adjudicated in a U.S. court 
because the official had acted in an official capacity as an argument on the 
merits. 
The general understanding, articulated by Secretary of State Edmund 
Randolph, was thus that “process may issue from [U.S.] courts against any 
person not of the Diplomatic corps, or under their protection.”27  Although 
the principle of diplomatic immunity was firmly established, other foreign 
officials were, “with respect to [their] suability, on a footing with every other 
foreigner (not a [diplomatic official]) who comes within the jurisdiction of 
our courts.”28  When foreign governments protested judicial proceedings 
against their ships and their nondiplomatic officials, executive branch 
officials consistently disclaimed the authority to halt such proceedings, 
despite sharply worded entreaties.29 
Although they disavowed the authority to direct dismissal, executive 
branch officials expressed confidence to their foreign counterparts that U.S. 
courts would ultimately dismiss claims against individuals who had acted 
within the scope of lawful authority conferred by a foreign state.  For 
example, Attorney General William Bradford opined that a court would not 
find the defendant liable for “an official act, done by the defendant by virtue, 
or under color, of the powers vested in him” by a foreign country.30  A foreign 
government’s certification that a nondiplomatic official had acted “within his 
lawful powers” could provide an affirmative defense on the merits.31 
In addition to highlighting the availability of affirmative defenses, the U.S. 
Department of Justice developed a practice of submitting “suggestions of 
immunity” while still disclaiming the constitutional authority to direct a court 
 
 26. See, e.g., Dupont v. Pichon, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 321, 323–24 (Pa. 1805) (distinguishing 
between the jurisdictional privilege accorded diplomats, including chargés d’affaires, and the 
merits claim that a defendant had acted in his official capacity and should therefore not “be 
deemed personally responsible” for the alleged acts). 
 27. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the 
French Republic (June 8, 1794), in 6 DOMESTIC LETTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
1784–1906, 349, 350 (1943). 
 28. Actions Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1797) (Case of Sinclair); Suits 
Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 49 (1794) (Case of Cochran[e]); see also Suits Against 
Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45 (1794) (Case of Collot). 
 29. See, e.g., Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the 
French Republic (Mar. 14, 1796), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:  FOREIGN RELATIONS 550, 
550 (1797) (indicating that any attempt by the executive to “remove” a suit against a French 
ship from the judiciary “would be a violation of the constitution”). 
 30. Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 (1794) (Case of Collot). 
 31. See, e.g., Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Letombe, Consul Gen. of the French 
Republic (May 29, 1797), in 10 DOMESTIC LETTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1784–
1906, 51, 51–52 (1943). 
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to dismiss a private suit.32  Yet, this practice was not consistent:  sometimes, 
the executive branch remained silent, and foreign governments filed 
submissions directly with the court; other times, the U.S. Attorney 
transmitted statements sent by the foreign government to the State 
Department; and still other times, the executive branch filed a “suggestion” 
confirming certain facts about the defendant or articulating its view of the 
applicable law.33  Courts generally viewed these “suggestions” as conclusive 
of “the truth of the facts alleged.”34  In cases involving individual defendants, 
courts looked to the State Department to certify whether the defendant had 
been received as an official representative of a foreign state,35 and they 
looked to common-law and international law principles to determine whether 
an official who was not entitled to diplomatic immunity could nonetheless 
establish an affirmative defense.36 
Claims against foreign officials remained relatively rare compared to those 
against foreign ships and, as trade increased, to claims against companies 
owned or operated by foreign states.  In the 1930s, the Supreme Court began 
to rely more heavily on executive branch suggestions as controlling—rather 
than merely informing—determinations of immunity from in rem 
proceedings.37  Two decisions in the 1940s cemented the transition to a 
deferential posture.  In 1943, the Supreme Court held in Ex parte Republic of 
Peru38 that the State Department’s “certification and the request that the 
vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive 
determination by the political arm of the Government that the continued 
retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign 
relations.”39  The Court reiterated this principle in Republic of Mexico v. 
Hoffman.40  There, the State Department declined to take a position on 
 
 32. On the development of this practice, see Chimène I. Keitner, Between Law and 
Diplomacy:  The Conundrum of Common Law Immunity, 54 GA. L. REV. 217, 233–39 (2019). 
 33. See Francis Deák, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of 
Appeals, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 453, 457 n.11 (1940). 
 34. Id. at 459. 
 35. See, e.g., Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 36. See generally Chimène I. Keitner, Adjudicating Acts of State, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 49, 50 (John Norton Moore ed., 2013) (tracing the 
common doctrinal roots of the act of state doctrine and conduct-based immunity). 
 37. See Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 
74 (1938); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 
Individual Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 11 (2009) (“[S]tarting 
in the late 1930s, courts began to give essentially absolute deference to Executive Branch 
views on whether immunity should be granted.”); G. Edward White, The Transformation of 
the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 134–38 (1999) (observing 
that, in the nineteenth century, “[j]udicial resolutions of foreign sovereign immunity issues 
were made on the basis of customary international law, which was treated as part of common 
law”); Wuerth, supra note 6, at 925 (noting that “the Court began to defer to the executive 
branch on all aspects of immunity” in the 1930s).  But see Lewis Yelin, Head of State Immunity 
as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 911, 945 (2011) (arguing that the 
“trend toward absolute deference” began earlier). 
 38. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
 39. Id. at 589.  On deference to the executive branch, see infra Part III. 
 40. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
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Mexico’s assertion that the ship was immune from judicial seizure.41  Citing 
its recent opinion in Ex parte Peru, the Court held that “it is an accepted rule 
of substantive law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts that 
they accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel shall be 
treated as immune.”42  In the absence of a suggestion of immunity, “the court 
will inquire whether the ground of immunity is one which it is the established 
policy of the [State] department to recognize.”43 
The nature of the proceedings in Ex parte Peru and Hoffman led the 
Supreme Court to characterize the protection from suit in those cases as a 
jurisdictional immunity.  In Ex parte Peru, the Court said that if the claim of 
immunity were recognized, “it is the court’s duty to surrender the vessel.”44  
In an in rem proceeding, surrender of the vessel also meant surrender of 
jurisdiction, a point the Court made explicit in Hoffman.45  The jurisdiction 
surrendered was not subject matter jurisdiction but rather personal 
jurisdiction, which broadly includes jurisdiction in personam, in rem, and 
quasi-in-rem. 
Contemporary observers viewed Ex parte Peru and Hoffman as a 
pronounced break with prior practice.  Francis Deák warned that the 
implications of these decisions were “far-reaching,” since “[i]t would mean 
that the Department of State would be required to exercise judicial or 
quasi-judicial powers in each instance when a foreign government, involved 
in litigation in our courts, should request Executive assistance . . . .”46  In his 
view, “[t]his result would seem to be inconsistent with our system of 
government, built on the theory of separation of powers, since it would 
require the exercise by the executive of powers which belong to the 
judiciary.”47 
The applicable principles of sovereign immunity were undergoing a shift 
during this period, as the State Department embraced the restrictive theory, 
under which foreign governments are not immune from suit for claims based 
on their private acts, including commercial activities (acta jure gestionis).  
The State Department formally announced its adoption of this theory in the 
1952 Tate Letter.48  In the State Department’s view, “the widespread and 
increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial 
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing 
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.”49  Although 
 
 41. Id. at 31–32. 
 42. Id. at 36. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). 
 45. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34 (noting that “jurisdiction in rem acquired by the judicial 
seizure of the vessel . . . will be surrendered on recognition” of immunity). 
 46. Deák, supra note 33, at 461. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate 
Letter] (indicating that “the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign 
or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis)”). 
 49. Id. at 985. 
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the Tate Letter announced the official adoption of the restrictive theory, it did 
not offer “specific guidelines or criteria for differentiating between a 
sovereign’s private and public acts.”50  It also acknowledged explicitly that 
“a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts,” but it expressed 
the view “that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity 
where the executive has declined to do so.”51 
Relatively few suits were filed against foreign officials between the Tate 
Letter and the enactment of the FSIA in 1976.  A compilation of State 
Department immunity decisions from 1952 to 1977 contains 110 decisions, 
only six of which involved requests for suggestions of immunity on behalf 
of individuals:  two defendants who claimed head-of-state immunity and four 
defendants who claimed immunity on the grounds that they had acted on 
behalf of foreign states.52  Like the Supreme Court in Ex parte Peru and 
Hoffman, the State Department appears to have treated immunity as a 
question of personal jurisdiction during this time.  In one decision, for 
example, the State Department described the type of jurisdiction at issue as 
personal, explaining that “[u]nless a government engaging in jure gestionis 
activities will accept in personam jurisdiction, the only alternative is the in 
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction obtainable by attachment in accordance with 
the law of the forum.”53  The nature of the foreign government’s activities—
public or private—thus dictated, at least in theory, whether it could be haled 
into a U.S. court. 
The State Department developed an internal administrative procedure to 
handle requests from foreign states for suggestions of immunity.54  This 
included inviting parties “to attend an informal hearing at the Department 
with an opportunity for oral argument and the submission of briefs.”55  
Andreas Lowenfeld, a former senior official in the State Department’s Office 
of the Legal Adviser, formed a withering view of this process, lamenting in 
1969 that “[t]he law applied in the United States to claims against foreign 
states is at present an amalgam of judicial decisions, Executive Branch 
policies, some uncertain notions of international law and wholly inadequate 
procedure.”56  The situation ultimately became untenable, and the State 
Department and the Department of Justice found themselves wanting once 
 
 50. Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 41 (1978). 
 51. Tate Letter, supra note 48, at 985. 
 52. See generally Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, May 1952 
to January 1977, 1977 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW app. 
[hereinafter Sovereign Immunity Decisions]; see also Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law 
of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 72 (2010). 
 53. Sovereign Immunity Decisions, supra note 52, at 1040; see also id. at 1040–41 
(distinguishing between immunity from jurisdiction in personam or in rem, on the one hand, 
and immunity from execution, on the other). 
 54. von Mehren, supra note 50, at 41. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States—A Proposal for Reform of 
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 901 (1969). 
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again to be “in a position to assert that the question of immunity is entirely 
one for the courts.”57 
Congress responded by enacting the FSIA.58  It found that “the 
determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to 
immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of 
justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in 
United States courts.”59  State Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh 
wrote to Attorney General Edward Levi that the statute, “which was drafted 
by both of our Departments, has as one of its objectives the elimination of 
the State Department’s current responsibility in making sovereign immunity 
determinations,” and that “[i]n accordance with the practice in most other 
countries, the statute places the responsibility for deciding sovereign 
immunity issues exclusively with the courts.”60 
The FSIA applies to civil suits filed in both state and federal courts.61  The 
Act governs suits against “foreign state[s],” which it defines to include “a 
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state.”62  An agency or instrumentality means “a separate legal 
person, corporate or otherwise” that is either an “organ” of a foreign state, or 
an entity, the majority of whose “shares or other ownership interest” are 
owned directly by a foreign state.63  Section 1330(a) gives the federal district 
courts original subject matter jurisdiction over any nonjury action against a 
foreign state where a statutory exception to immunity applies.64  Section 
1330(b) creates personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign “as to every 
claim for relief over which the district courts have [original] jurisdiction” if 
the defendant has been properly served.65  The House report accompanying 
the FSIA described § 1330(b) as providing, “in effect, a Federal long-arm 
statute over foreign states” that embodies “[t]he requirements of minimum 
jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice.”66  Whether defendants who are 
served with process under the FSIA can seek dismissal on due process 
grounds has not been resolved definitively.  The Supreme Court has 
suggested that foreign states might not be entitled to constitutional due 
 
 57. Immunities of Foreign States:  Hearing on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims 
and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 34 (1973). 
 58. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 
1441(d), 1602–1611 (2018). 
 59. Id. § 1602. 
 60. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to Edward H. Levi, U.S. 
Att’y Gen. (Nov. 22, 1976), in 75 DEP’T ST. BULL. 649, 649 (1976). 
 61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.  The FSIA neither provides a basis for, nor forecloses, the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities. 
Chimène I. Keitner, Prosecuting Foreign States, 61 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 234 (2021).  Section 
1441(d) provides for the removal of a civil action against a foreign state from state court to 
federal court for a nonjury trial. 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). 
 63. Id. § 1603(b). 
 64. Id. § 1330(a). 
 65. Id. § 1330(b). 
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 13 (1976). 
2021] FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 689 
process protections, and a number of lower courts have so held.67  Foreign 
state-owned enterprises likely are entitled to due process, unless they are 
deemed agents of a foreign state.68 
After the FSIA’s passage, the treatment of head-of-state, diplomatic, and 
consular immunity continued much as before. Foreign officials who were 
entitled to status-based immunity as sitting diplomats or heads of state could 
still secure dismissal on the basis of a suggestion from the State 
Department.69  The United States had also joined treaties regulating 
diplomatic and consular immunity.70  The question arose whether other 
foreign officials could claim immunity under the FSIA, notwithstanding the 
executive’s position that the FSIA did not govern claims against natural 
persons. 
Courts were divided.  In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank,71 the Ninth 
Circuit held that the FSIA shielded a foreign official from suit for acts 
performed in an official capacity—in this case, instructing the Philippine 
National Bank not to make payment on a letter of credit.72  The court 
observed that “pre-1976 common law expressly extended immunity to 
individual officials acting in their official capacity.”73  It thus affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of the claims against the official, on the grounds that 
“a suit against an individual acting in his official capacity is the practical 
equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly.”74 
Applying the FSIA to an individual defendant led the court in Chuidian to 
treat foreign official immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, 
rather than as a matter of personal jurisdiction or as an affirmative defense.  
The same was true of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Belhas v. Ya’alon,75 
 
 67. See Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (suggesting that 
foreign states would not qualify as “persons” for due process purposes); Frontera Res. Azer. 
Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399–400 (2d Cir. 2009); Price v. 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 68. Compare GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(holding that an independent state-owned corporation was entitled to due process protection), 
with Frontera, 582 F.3d at 400 (holding that a foreign company does not enjoy due process 
protections if it is an agent of a foreign state).  See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process 
and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 633 (2019) 
(arguing that “it makes little sense to afford litigation-related constitutional protections to 
foreign corporations . . . but to deny categorically such protections to foreign states”). 
 69. See, e.g., Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher was entitled to head-of-state immunity). 
 70. See VCDR, supra note 22; VCCR, supra note 22; Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 
22 U.S.C. § 254(a)–(e) (implementing VCDR); see also infra Part II.B. 
 71. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 72. Id. at 1103. 
 73. Id. at 1101.  The court noted that the official would not enjoy sovereign immunity for 
acts either “completely outside his governmental authority,” id. at 1106 (quoting United States 
v. Yakima Tribal Ct., 806 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1986)), or “beyond the scope of his 
authority,” id. 
 74. Id. at 1101–02.  Had this case arisen in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, 
the court could have found instead that the official did not bear personal responsibility for the 
alleged official acts. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 75. 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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which upheld the district court’s dismissal of claims against the former head 
of Israeli Army Intelligence relating to the shelling of a U.N. compound in 
Lebanon for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.76 
The Second Circuit took a different route to the same result in another case 
against a former Israeli official.  In Matar v. Dichter,77 the district court 
found that the former head of the Israeli Security Agency was an “agency or 
instrumentality of [a] foreign state” under the FSIA.78  On appeal, the Second 
Circuit relied on the common-law principle that an individual official is 
entitled to immunity for “acts performed in his official capacity.”79  The court 
of appeals thus found that “even if Dichter, as a former foreign official, is not 
categorically eligible for immunity under the FSIA (a question we need not 
decide here), he is nevertheless immune from suit under common-law 
principles that pre-date, and survive, the enactment of that statute.”80 
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court held definitively that the FSIA 
does not govern suits against foreign officials.81  The Court characterized 
World War II era, pre-FSIA practice in cases involving seized vessels as 
entailing a “two-step procedure” for asserting sovereign immunity.82  The 
Court observed that if the State Department granted a foreign state’s request 
to provide a suggestion of immunity, “the district court surrendered its 
jurisdiction.”83  If the State Department did not suggest immunity, the court 
made its own determination by inquiring “whether the ground of immunity 
is one which it is the established policy of the [State Department] to 
recognize.”84  Although the FSIA “indisputably governs” the immunity from 
suit of a foreign state,85 the Court rejected the argument that the term “foreign 
state” should be interpreted to include natural persons.  Among other reasons, 
the Court noted that the terms used to define “agency or instrumentality” (like 
the word “entity”) “apply awkwardly, if at all, to individuals,”86 that the FSIA 
“expressly mentioned officials when it wished to count their acts as 
equivalent to those of the foreign state,”87 and that the methods specified for 
service of process “are at best very roundabout ways of serving an individual 
official.”88  Viewing the statute as a whole, the Court concluded that the Act 
 
 76. Id. at 1284. 
 77. 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 78. Id. at 291. 
 79. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 80. Id.  The court also noted that the United States had filed a Statement of Interest in the 
district court “specifically recognizing Dichter’s immunity and urging that appellants’ suit ‘be 
dismissed on immunity grounds.’” Id. 
 81. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010). 
 82. Id. at 311.  The Court also noted that diplomatic and consular officials could claim the 
“specialized immunities” accorded to those officials, as could officials qualifying as the “head 
of state.” Id. at 312 n.6. 
 83. Id. at 311. 
 84. Id. at 312 (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945) (alteration 
in original)). 
 85. Id. at 313. 
 86. Id. at 315. 
 87. Id. at 317. 
 88. Id. at 318. 
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did not “codif[y] the common law with respect to the immunity of individual 
officials.”89 
Having reached this conclusion, the Court declined to “resolve the dispute 
among the parties as to the precise scope of an official’s immunity at common 
law.”90  The Court also did not take an affirmative position regarding the 
proper role of the executive branch in foreign official immunity 
determinations, noting simply that the State Department “has from the time 
of the FSIA’s enactment understood the Act to leave intact the Department’s 
role in official immunity cases.”91 
The Court noted several immediate implications of its decision.  First, 
plaintiffs seeking to sue foreign officials cannot take advantage of the FSIA’s 
provisions on personal jurisdiction and service of process.92  Second, the 
foreign state might be a required party to the litigation whose joinder is not 
feasible, thereby compelling dismissal of the suit.93  Third, in “some actions 
against an official in his official capacity,” the foreign state might be what 
the Court called the “real party in interest,” meaning in this context that the 
suit should be treated as if it were brought against the state because it seeks 
a remedy from the state rather than the named official.94 
Under this reasoning, if the foreign state is what Samantar calls the “real 
party in interest,” then the claim will be treated as if it had been made under 
the FSIA.  The FSIA’s provisions regarding service and jurisdiction, and its 
exceptions to jurisdictional immunity, will apply, and any resulting judgment 
will bind the foreign state, not the named individual.95  This scenario is 
similar to that described in the American Law Institute’s Restatement 
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law section 66(f), which the Court noted but 
 
 89. Id. at 320. 
 90. Id. at 321.  The Court also noted, but did not take a position on, the rule applied by 
certain courts “that foreign sovereign immunity extends to an individual official ‘for acts 
committed in his official capacity’ but not to ‘an official who acts beyond the scope of his 
authority.’” Id. at 322 n.17 (quoting Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 917 F.2d 1095, 
1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 91. Id. at 323 n.19; see also id. at 323 (stating that “[w]e have been given no reason to 
believe that Congress saw [the Department’s role] as a problem” in the “few and far between” 
cases where it arose); infra Part III. 
 92. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 324 n.20. 
 93. Id. at 324–25. 
 94. Id. at 325; cf. id. at 324 n.20 (noting, conversely, that “a plaintiff seeking to sue a 
foreign official will not be able to rely on the Act’s service of process and jurisdictional 
provisions”). 
 95. When courts have found that the state is the real party in interest, some have applied 
the FSIA directly to the foreign official defendants. See, e.g., Edwards v. Fed. Gov’t of 
Nigeria, No. 18-11133, 2018 WL 6619741, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 2018) (“Accordingly, the 
‘real party in interest’ is plainly the foreign state of Nigeria, and the FSIA applies to the 
officials named as defendants.”); Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 930 F. Supp. 2d 17, 35 
(D.D.C. 2013) (holding that because “the Kenyan government is ‘the real party in 
interest[,]’ . . . [t]he Court’s FSIA analysis . . . applies to all defendants including the 
individuals”).  Others have dismissed on the ground that the wrong party has been sued. See, 
e.g., Gomes v. ANGOP, Ang. Press Agency, No. 11-CV-0580, 2012 WL 3637453, at *19 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012) (“[B]ecause the Individual Defendants are not the real parties in 
interest in this case this action against them is dismissed.”). 
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did not analyze.96  Although Samantar declined to take a position on the 
Restatement (Second)’s treatment of foreign official immunity, the rule 
articulated in section 66(f) is best understood as equivalent to Samantar’s 
“real party in interest” proviso:  it provides for foreign official immunity “if 
the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against 
the state.”97  Because that situation is now covered by the FSIA, section 66(f) 
has no continuing force, although some courts have been urged to resurrect 
section 66(f) in a misguided attempt to define the scope of conduct-based 
immunity for a nondiplomatic official’s “official acts.”98 
Samantar clarified the basic doctrinal landscape for foreign official 
immunity claims but left many questions unanswered.  Broadly speaking, 
this landscape includes:  (1) a statutory regime for the immunities of foreign 
states and state-controlled entities; (2) a treaty-based regime for diplomatic 
and consular immunity, which is also codified in domestic law; and (3) a 
federal-common-law regime for the immunities of foreign officials who do 
not fall within those provisions.  Part II takes a closer look at the categories 
of foreign official immunity that form parts (2) and (3) of this doctrinal 
landscape. 
II.  FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY TODAY 
Following Samantar, courts have identified three basic categories of 
foreign official immunity:  head-of-state immunity, diplomatic and consular 
immunity, and conduct-based immunity.99  Although these immunities are 
typically raised in suits brought against individuals, the immunities 
ultimately belong to the foreign state.100  This means, among other things, 
that the foreign state can waive all these forms of immunity.101  This part 
examines current law with respect to each form of immunity. 
 
 96. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 321 n.15 (“We express no view on whether Restatement § 66 
correctly sets out the scope of the common-law immunity applicable to current or former 
foreign officials.”). 
 97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 66(f) (AM. L. INST. 1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. 
 98. E.g., Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (applying section 66(f) 
upon agreement by the parties).  But see Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, No. 20-7040, 
2021 WL 3950185, at *10 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 2021) (noting that “[n]either the Supreme Court 
nor this court has ever endorsed [Section 66(f)]”). 
 99. Each of these immunities applies only to natural persons, although at least one 
company has asserted conduct-based immunity because it was acting as the agent of a foreign 
government, albeit unsuccessfully at the district court level. See WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Grp. 
Techs. Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 3d 649, 664–65 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (rejecting a corporation’s claim of 
conduct-based immunity) (appeal pending). 
 100. See Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 
Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 177, ¶ 188 (June 4) (“The Court observes that such [an immunity 
ratione materiae] claim is, in essence, a claim of immunity for the Djiboutian State, from 
which the procureur de la République and the Head of National Security would be said to 
benefit.”); see also Statement of Interest of the United States at 7, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 
1:04cv1360 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011) (“The immunity protecting foreign officials for their 
official acts ultimately belongs to the sovereign rather than the official.”). 
 101. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14) (noting that heads of state “will cease to enjoy 
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The U.S. law of foreign official immunity comes from a number of 
different sources.102  Diplomatic and consular immunities are codified in 
treaties103 and implemented by statutes.104  Head-of-state immunity and 
conduct-based immunity are governed by customary international law105 and 
implemented by federal common law.106  As indicated above, Samantar 
further clarified that the FSIA will apply to certain suits against foreign 
officials because the foreign state is the “real party in interest.”107 
It is only with respect to head-of-state immunity and conduct-based 
immunity that U.S. courts must develop rules of federal common law to 
decide whether civil or criminal proceedings can move forward against a 
foreign official who comes within the court’s personal jurisdiction.  In such 
 
immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have represented 
decides to waive that immunity”); VCDR, supra note 22, art. 32(1) (“The immunity from 
jurisdiction of diplomatic agents . . . may be waived by the sending State.”); VCCR, supra 
note 22, art. 45(1) (“The sending State may waive, with regard to a member of the consular 
post, any of the privileges and immunities provided for in articles 41, 43 and 44.”).  U.S. courts 
have repeatedly given effect to waivers of foreign official immunity by foreign governments. 
See, e.g., Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1151 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that Bolivia 
had waived immunity of former president); In re Grand Jury Proc., Doe No. 700, 817 F.2d 
1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1987) (giving effect to Philippines’s waiver of former president’s 
immunity); Free & Sovereign State of Chihuahua v. Duarte Jaquez, No. 20-00086, 2020 WL 
3977672, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 14, 2020) (holding that Mexican state waived immunity of 
foreign state official by filing civil suit against him); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 210–11 
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (giving effect to Haiti’s waiver of former president’s immunity).  One court 
has held that foreign officials may not waive their immunity if the foreign state objects. See 
Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 32 F. Supp. 3d 486, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that Israel 
had standing to prevent official from testifying regardless of whether the official was willing 
to testify). 
 102. The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law addressed head-of-state, diplomatic, and consular immunity, but not 
conduct-based immunity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 97, §§ 66(b), 66(d)–(f), 
73–82; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 464–465 (AM. L. INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].  These restatements also 
addressed the immunities of officials of international organizations (IOs). RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) §§ 85–86; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 469–470.  The Restatement (Fourth) has not 
yet attempted to restate the law of foreign official immunity or IO official immunity. 
 103. See VCDR, supra note 22; VCCR, supra note 22. 
 104. See 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)–(e). 
 105. See generally Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. 3. 
 106. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010).  Although Samantar referred 
simply to “the common law,” id., lower courts have considered the common law of foreign 
official immunity to be “federal common law.” United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 794 
F.3d 787, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2015).  Federal common-law rules bind state courts as well as 
federal courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) 
(characterizing the federal common-law “act of state doctrine” as “a principle of decision 
binding on federal and state courts alike”).  There is disagreement about whether customary 
international law more generally should be treated as federal common law. Compare Curtis 
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  A 
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary 
international law should not be treated as federal common law), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (arguing that customary 
international law should be treated as federal common law).  But even critics of the more 
general proposition agree that foreign official immunity should be treated as federal common 
law. See Bradley, supra note 14, at 6. 
 107. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325. 
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circumstances, as explained below, separation of powers principles suggest 
that courts should not develop federal common-law rules that exceed the 
immunity that international law clearly requires.108  Several considerations 
support the need for judicial restraint in extending immunities.  First, ever 
since Erie, the Supreme Court has counseled caution in developing new rules 
of federal common law, even in the area of foreign relations.  In Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain,109 for example, the Supreme Court noted that “the general 
practice has been to look for legislative guidance” before developing federal 
common law,110 and it cautioned against courts defining “new and debatable” 
rules of international law.111  Although Sosa was referring to international 
law rules of liability, the same goes for rules of immunity. 
Second, judicially developed rules of foreign official immunity have the 
potential to frustrate the application of various statutes that Congress has 
passed.  Congress has criminalized conduct such as torture, war crimes, 
genocide, and the use of child soldiers, even when this conduct occurs outside 
U.S. territory.112  Some conduct, including torture and extrajudicial killing, 
can also lead to civil liability under U.S. law.113  Broad rules of foreign 
official immunity could upset legislative expectations by shielding acts that 
Congress wanted to subject to criminal prosecution and civil liability.114  
Absent explicit guidance from Congress, courts should accord the 
immunities that international law requires, but no more.  To be clear, this 
Article does not argue that statutes such as the Torture Victim Protection Act 
of 1991115 (TVPA) override rules of foreign official immunity by their own 
force.116  As the Supreme Court has noted, “Congress legislates against the 
 
 108. When the executive branch expresses a view about what customary international law 
clearly requires, courts should generally defer to that view. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 102, § 112 cmt. c (“Courts give particular weight to the position taken by the United 
States Government on questions of international law because it is deemed desirable that so far 
as possible the United States speak with one voice on such matters.”); cf. Abbott v. Abbott, 
560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (“It is well settled that the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty 
‘is entitled to great weight.’” (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 
176, 184 n.10 (1982))).  For further discussion of deference to executive branch interpretations 
of foreign official immunity under customary international law, see infra Part III. 
 109. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 110. Id. at 726. 
 111. Id. at 728. 
 112. Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d); Torture Convention 
Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A; War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2441; Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442. 
 113. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.  Certain 
violations of the “law of nations” also carry the potential for civil liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 114. The legislative history of the TVPA indicates that the statute would not override 
diplomatic and head-of-state immunity, but it goes on to state that “the committee does not 
intend these immunities to provide former officials with a defense to a lawsuit brought under 
this legislation.” S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7–8 (1991) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
102-367, at 5 (1991) (“While sovereign immunity would not generally be an available defense, 
nothing in the TVPA overrides the doctrines of diplomatic and head of state immunity.”). 
 115. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note). 
 116. In Lewis v. Mutond, two judges interpreted the TVPA to override rules of 
conduct-based immunity. See 918 F.3d 142, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Randolph, J., concurring), 
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backdrop of the common law,”117 and this includes common-law rules of 
immunity.118  In the absence of a clear indication from Congress to the 
contrary, it is perfectly appropriate to read human rights statutes as 
recognizing and preserving clearly established international law rules on 
foreign official immunity.119  But it is quite another thing for courts to create 
new rules of federal common law, not based in international law, to 
immunize conduct for which Congress has created liability.120  If courts 
should be cautious about making federal common law generally, they should 
be particularly cautious when such lawmaking would limit the application of 
federal statutes. 
Third, courts need not develop an expansive federal common law of 
foreign official immunity to avoid violating international law.  When state 
practice and opinio juris are mixed, states can exercise jurisdiction without 
running afoul of customary international law prohibitions.  As explained 
below, this is currently true with respect to violations of universally accepted 
prohibitions on torture, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
Fourth, extending foreign official immunity further than international law 
clearly requires does little as a doctrinal matter to compel the reciprocal 
treatment of U.S. officials by foreign courts.  Like the United States, other 
countries have an international legal obligation to accord immunities from 
legal process in certain circumstances, whether as a matter of customary 
international law or treaty law.  But when the United States extends more 
immunity than international law requires, other countries are not bound to 
reciprocate by extending the same immunities to U.S. officials. 
Finally, unless the United States is prepared to forego criminal 
prosecutions for a range of offenses committed by agents of foreign states, 
according greater immunity than international law clearly requires in the civil 
context could have the unintended effect of strengthening defenses to U.S. 
criminal prosecution.  This militates against expanding the rules of foreign 
 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 156 (2020) (mem.); id. at 148 (Srinivasan, J., concurring).  Other courts 
have rejected this argument. See Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d 888, 895 (9th Cir. 2019); Matar v. 
Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 117. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1016 
(2020). 
 118. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012) (noting that § 1983 should be read “in 
harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses” (quoting Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976))). 
 119. It is well established that federal statutes should be interpreted not to violate 
international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 102, § 114 (“Where fairly possible, 
a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an 
international agreement of the United States.”); see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (noting that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains”). 
 120. Cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) 
(criticizing the practice of applying immunities under § 1983 that were not part of the 
common-law backdrop when the statute was passed). 
696 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
official immunity beyond those that already exist under customary 
international law.121 
In sum, U.S. courts should not find foreign officials immune from civil 
and criminal proceedings unless international law clearly requires them to do 
so.  In addition to the usual reasons for caution in making federal common 
law, new rules of foreign official immunity may interfere with the application 
of laws that Congress has passed, without any clear reciprocal gain for the 
United States.  If Congress, as a matter of policy, wishes to extend foreign 
official immunity beyond what international law clearly requires, it can do 
so.  Courts, however, should not. 
A.  Head-of-State Immunity 
Sitting heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers are 
absolutely immune from suit during their terms of office.122  Head-of-state 
immunity is a status-based immunity (immunity ratione personae) that 
attaches because of these officials’ positions “to ensure the effective 
performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States.”123  
Head-of-state immunity is absolute in the sense that it applies to all acts, 
including those taken in a private capacity and those performed before the 
official assumed office.124  But absolute immunity lasts only during the 
official’s tenure in office.125 
The State Department has repeatedly filed suggestions of immunity for 
foreign heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers.126  For 
example, the United States has recently suggested immunity for the president 
 
 121. This reason also counsels against the executive branch adopting expansive 
interpretations of the customary international law governing foreign official immunity. 
 122. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 51, 54–55 (Feb. 14); Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 769 (4th 
Cir. 2012); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also 
Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States of America at 6, Miango v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-01265, 2019 WL 2191806 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2019) 
[hereinafter U.S. Miango Suggestion] (“Under the customary international law principles 
accepted by the Executive Branch, head of state immunity attaches to a head of state’s or head 
of government’s status as the current holder of the office.”). 
 123. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 53. 
 124. Id. ¶ 55 (noting that head-of-state immunity extends to acts performed in a “private 
capacity” and “before the person concerned assumed office”); Habyarimana v. Kagame, 696 
F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that a foreign head of state is immune from suit 
“even for acts committed prior to assuming office”).  The ICJ has also held that there is no 
exception to head-of-state immunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Arrest 
Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 58. 
 125. Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 61 (noting that absolute immunity ends when the official 
“ceases to hold the office”); Sikhs for Just. v. Singh, 64 F. Supp. 3d 190, 194 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(“The day he left office, however, [Prime Minister] Singh lost the absolute protection of 
status-based head-of-state immunity.”); see also infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 126. See John B. Bellinger & Stephen K. Wirth, Foreign-Official Immunity Under the 
Common Law, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND 433, 445 n.86 (Paul B. Stephan & Sarah 
H. Cleveland eds., 2020) (listing seventeen suggestions of head-of-state immunity since 
2010); Yelin, supra note 37, at 992–95 (listing earlier cases in which suggestions of 
head-of-state immunity were filed). 
2021] FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 697 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,127 the prime minister of Laos,128 
and the foreign minister of France.129  U.S. courts have consistently treated 
State Department suggestions of head-of-state immunity as conclusive.130  
Courts may also dismiss suits against sitting heads of state when the 
executive branch remains silent.131 
The absolute immunity that customary international law accords sitting 
foreign heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers also 
extends to criminal proceedings.  U.S. courts have taken the initiation of 
criminal proceedings by the U.S. Department of Justice as an indication that 
the executive branch does not view the defendant as entitled to head-of-state 
immunity.132  The opposite inference might be drawn in cases of 
prosecutorial restraint.  For example, the Department of Justice has not 
sought to prosecute a sitting head of state for drug trafficking despite 
implicating the head of state in the indictment of another defendant.133  Were 
the United States to indict a sitting foreign head of state absent a 
congressional statute explicitly abrogating head-of-state immunity for the 
charged conduct, a U.S. court would face the difficult and unresolved 
question of whether the executive branch has authority under domestic law 
to violate customary international law.134  Although a full examination of this 
issue lies beyond the scope of this Article, there does not appear to be any 
domestic legal basis for the executive branch to violate a sitting head of 
state’s status-based immunity. 
Individuals who do not occupy these three positions are not entitled to 
head-of-state immunity because there is no general and consistent state 
practice extending such immunity to other categories of high-ranking 
officials on that basis alone.135  Consequently, when the United States 
 
 127. U.S. Miango Suggestion, supra note 122. 
 128. Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States of America, 
Savang v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 16-02037 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2017). 
 129. Suggestion of Immunity Submitted by the United States of America, France.com, Inc. 
v. French Republic, No. 18-00460 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4, 2019). 
 130. See, e.g., Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Yousuf v. 
Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 772 (4th Cir. 2012); Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 626 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
 131. Weiming Chen v. Ying-jeou Ma, No. 12-5232, 2013 WL 4437607, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 19, 2013) (finding that the President of Taiwan was “entitled to head-of-state immunity 
under the common law”). 
 132. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 133. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Honduran National Convicted on Drug 
Trafficking and Weapons Charges (Mar. 22, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/honduran-national-convicted-drug-trafficking-and-weapons-charges 
[https://perma.cc/29EY-4S8B]. 
 134. The original understanding was that the president lacked authority to violate 
international law without authorization from Congress. William S. Dodge, Customary 
International Law, Change, and the Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1565 (2018). 
 135. In Arrest Warrant, the ICJ raised the possibility that head-of-state immunity might 
extend to other “holders of high-ranking office in a State.” Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 51 (Feb. 14).  But there 
is no general and consistent state practice extending head-of-state immunity beyond these 
three officials. Int’l L. Comm’n, Second Report on the Immunity of State Officials from 
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 47, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/661 (Apr. 4, 2013).  Other foreign 
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suggested head-of-state immunity for the head of state of the United Arab 
Emirates, it did not suggest immunity for other officials named in the same 
suit.136  Recently, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, widely 
known as MBS, has claimed immunity as a de facto head of state.137  But 
because he is not the actual head of state, head of government, or foreign 
minister of Saudi Arabia, his claim is unfounded.138  The suits against him 
might be dismissed on other nonimmunity grounds.  But MBS is not entitled 
to status-based immunity and, as explored below, his alleged conduct in 
ordering the extrajudicial killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi would not be 
shielded by conduct-based immunity under either international law or federal 
common law. 
B.  Diplomatic, Consular, and Other Treaty-Based Immunities 
Many immunities accorded foreign officials in domestic courts are now 
governed by treaty and statute.  These include diplomatic immunity, consular 
immunity, and immunities for officials of the United Nations and other 
international organizations.  Some of these immunities are principally 
status-based, whereas others are principally conduct-based. 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, implemented by the 
Diplomatic Relations Act ,139 governs diplomatic immunity in U.S. courts.140  
As a general matter, diplomats enjoy absolute status-based immunity from 
the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, and nearly absolute 
status-based immunity from civil and administrative proceedings.141  The 
 
officials may be granted absolute immunity on a temporary basis as a part of a visiting 
delegation. See infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text (discussing “special missions” 
immunity). 
 136. Hassen v. Nahyan, No. 09-01106, 2010 WL 9538408, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) 
(finding that “[b]ecause Defendant Sheikh Mohamed is not one of these three individuals or 
designated as a member of their official parties, he is not entitled to absolute immunity as a 
head of state”). 
 137. See Runde, supra note 13. 
 138. Cf. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki (Feb. 16, 2021), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/02/16/press-briefing-by-
press-secretary-jen-psaki-february-16-2021/ [https://perma.cc/R5K7-SKKY] (noting that 
“[t]he President’s counterpart is King Salman”).  In a separate case involving a commercial 
dispute, one U.S. court denied MBS’s claim of head-of-state immunity while granting him 
conduct-based immunity from suit based on the arrest of the former crown prince that 
allegedly prevented a promised payment to the plaintiff. See Aldossari v. Ripp, No. 20-3187, 
2021 WL 1819699, at *12–18 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2021). 
 139. 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)–(e). 
 140. See VCDR, supra note 22; 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)–(e).  The Diplomatic Relations Act 
extends diplomatic immunity even to envoys from countries that are not party to the VCDR. 
22 U.S.C. § 254(b). 
 141. VCDR, supra note 22, art. 31(1).  The receiving state can exercise civil jurisdiction 
with respect to certain actions involving private property and over actions “relating to any 
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State 
outside his official functions.” Id.  Diplomatic immunity also extends to the members of a 
diplomat’s household and to a diplomatic mission’s administrative and technical staff, except 
that staff members must not be nationals or permanent residents of the receiving state in order 
to enjoy immunity, and their immunity does not encompass “acts performed outside the course 
of their duties.” Id. art. 37. 
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State Department’s certification of an individual’s diplomatic status is 
conclusive.142  Diplomatic immunity shields an individual from legal 
proceedings, even if the proceedings began before that status was 
acquired.143  When immunity prevents legal recourse against an individual, 
the receiving state can request that the sending state waive the diplomat’s 
immunity.144  It can also declare the diplomat “persona non grata” and 
compel the diplomat’s departure from its territory.145  As with other forms of 
status-based immunity, former diplomats do not enjoy absolute immunity, 
but they do enjoy residual conduct-based immunity for acts performed “in 
the exercise of [their] functions as . . . member[s] of the mission.”146 
Representatives and employees of international organizations (IOs) also 
enjoy certain immunities from the jurisdiction of a host state, as do members 
of foreign delegations to IOs.147  These can include status-based or 
conduct-based immunities, depending on the individual’s position and 
whether the individual is a national or permanent resident of the host state.148 
Closely related to diplomatic and IO-immunity is “special-missions 
immunity.”  Although the United States is not a party to the U.N. Convention 
on Special Missions,149 U.S. courts have deferred to executive branch 
suggestions of immunity for defendants who have been served with process 
 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 573 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
“the State Department’s certification, which is based upon a reasonable interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention, is conclusive evidence as to the diplomatic status of an individual”); 
Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that “the 
courts have generally accepted as conclusive the views of the State Department as to the fact 
of diplomatic status”). 
 143. United States v. Khobragade, 15 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Abdulaziz, 
741 F.2d at 1329–30. 
 144. VCDR, supra note 22, art. 31(1). 
 145. Id. art. 9. 
 146. Id. art. 39(2).  Compare Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
status-based diplomatic immunity from suit by domestic worker), with United States v. Al 
Sharaf, 183 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding no residual diplomatic immunity for 
acts that were not performed in connection with the duties or official functions of a diplomatic 
employee); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing residual 
conduct-based diplomatic immunity for suit only for “such acts as are directly imputable to 
the state or inextricably tied to a diplomat’s professional activities”). 
 147. See International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288d (extending the 
same immunities as those afforded to officers and employees of foreign governments).  The 
United States is party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 90 U.N.T.S. 327 (corrigendum), but not the Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 
261. 
 148. The International Organizations Immunities Act defines conduct-based immunity as 
encompassing suits “relating to acts performed by [representatives] in their official capacity 
and falling within their functions as such representatives, officers, or employees . . . .”  
22 U.S.C. § 288d(b); see Zuza v. Off. of the High Representative, 107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 99 
(D.D.C. 2015); cf. Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2010) (indicating with 
respect to diplomatic immunity for former U.N. officials that the question is “whether the 
plaintiffs’ allegations . . . involve acts that the defendants performed in the exercise of their 
United Nations functions”). 
 149. Dec. 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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in the United States while on “special diplomatic missions.”150  They have 
grounded this deference in the president’s authority “to conduct foreign 
affairs and receive foreign ministers.”151  Members of special diplomatic 
missions are accorded the same absolute, status-based immunity as foreign 
diplomats.  Hence, for example, a U.S. president could accord a foreign 
official, such as MBS, temporary status-based immunity during an official 
diplomatic visit, understanding that the decision to accord such immunity 
might come at a political cost. 
Consular officials, unlike diplomats, enjoy immunity only for acts 
performed in the exercise of their consular functions.152  Delineating the 
scope of functional immunity for consular officials has proved somewhat 
easier than for diplomatic officials because consular functions can be 
enumerated with greater specificity and “are for the most part less sensitive 
than the functions of diplomats.”153  The U.S. State Department guide on 
diplomatic and consular immunity makes clear that “[n]o law enforcement 
officer, U.S. Department of State officer, diplomatic mission, or consulate is 
authorized to determine whether a given set of circumstances constitutes an 
official act” for immunity purposes.154  Rather, “[t]his is an issue which may 
only be resolved by the court with subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged 
crime.”155  As the guide indicates, only after appearing in court can a person 
who is not entitled to status-based immunity “assert as an affirmative defense 
that the actions complained of arose in connection with the performance of 
official acts.”156  The same should hold true for other current or former 
foreign officials who are not entitled to claim status-based immunity, as Part 
IV argues. 
C.  Conduct-Based Immunity 
A foreign official who is not entitled to head-of-state, diplomatic, or 
consular immunity is still immune from proceedings based on “acts taken in 
 
 150. Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 37 (D.D.C. 2008) (indicating that “[t]he 
logic that underlies deference to the Executive’s assertion regarding a head of state or 
diplomatic agent is, in this Court’s view, equally applicable to a foreign minister who is part 
of a special diplomatic mission”). 
 151. Id. at 38. 
 152. VCCR, supra note 22, art. 43; see Bardales v. Consulate Gen. of Peru in N.Y., 490 F. 
Supp. 3d 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 153. Eileen Denza, Diplomatic and Consular Immunities:  Trends and Challenges, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF IMMUNITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 433, 435 (Tom Ruys et al., 
eds., 2019). 
 154. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFF. OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR 
IMMUNITY:  GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 11 (2018) 
[hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE], https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/07/2018-DipConImm_v5_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN8J-5MEY]. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.; see also id. at 22 (explaining that official acts immunity “is an affirmative defense 
to be raised before the U.S. court with subject matter jurisdiction over the alleged crime”).  
The same should hold true for a foreign state’s assertion of conduct-based immunity on behalf 
of other current or former foreign officials. See infra notes 306–09 and accompanying text. 
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his official capacity.”157  This type of immunity is called conduct-based 
immunity because it turns on the nature of the conduct, rather than the status 
of the official.158  Because it does not depend on an official’s status, 
conduct-based immunity continues after an official leaves office.159 
Whether a foreign official was acting in an official capacity for purposes 
of conduct-based immunity depends in part on the scope of the official’s 
authority under foreign law.  In some cases, foreign governments have 
confirmed that their officials were acting within their authority, and U.S. 
courts have given such statements significant weight.160  If disputed, 
however, the question of an official’s authority under foreign law is a 
question of law for a U.S. court to decide.161  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
recently held in a nonimmunity case that, although a federal court should give 
“respectful consideration” to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own 
law, the court “is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign 
government’s statements.”162  If the foreign state indicates that the official 
was not acting in an official capacity, or if the foreign state waives the 
official’s immunity, then there is no basis for a court to find conduct-based 
immunity. 
The more difficult question is whether to treat certain acts as beyond an 
official’s capacity for purposes of conduct-based immunity even if those acts 
were authorized by the official’s government.  Not all acts authorized by 
foreign governments benefit from conduct-based immunity under 
international law.  In particular, many countries have denied such immunity 
to violations of universally accepted prohibitions on torture, genocide, war 
 
 157. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 322 (2010); see also Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14).  Courts 
have rejected claims of foreign official immunity by private parties acting on behalf of foreign 
governments. See Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, No. 20-7040, 2021 WL 3950185, at *8–
9 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 2021) (rejecting immunity claims by U.S. citizens hired by foreign 
governments).  But cf. Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding, 
in a pre-Samantar decision, that a private contractor following foreign government orders was 
entitled to “derivative immunity” under the FSIA). 
 158. See, e.g., Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Yousuf v. Samantar, 
699 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Letter from Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh to 
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. Stuart F. Delery (Sept. 7, 2012), Doe v. Zedillo, No. 11-01433 
(D. Conn. July 18, 2013) [hereinafter Zedillo Letter]. Conduct-based immunity is sometimes 
also called “official acts immunity,” see, e.g., Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653, 662–63  
(E.D. Va. 2014), “functional immunity,” HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE 
IMMUNITY 570 (rev. 3d ed., 2015), or “immunity ratione materiae,” id. 
 159. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 774 (“This type of [conduct-based] immunity stands on the foreign 
official’s actions, not his or her status, and therefore applies whether the individual is currently 
a government official or not.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Buratai, 318 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232–33 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that 
“Nigeria’s authorization and ratification establishes that the defendants acted in their official 
capacities”); Lewis v. Mutond, 258 F. Supp. 3d 168, 174 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding “the DRC 
Ambassador’s ratification of the defendants’ actions sufficient to establish that they were 
acting in their official capacities in the present case”), vacated and remanded, 918 F.3d 142 
(D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 161. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (stating that a federal court’s determination of foreign law 
“must be treated as a ruling on a question of law”). 
 162. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018). 
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crimes, and crime against humanity, as well as to acts of espionage, sabotage, 
and kidnapping by state officials. 
There has been some confusion about how to define “official capacity” in 
this context.  As one of the present authors has previously noted, 
“international law relies on the concept of ‘official capacity’ in many 
different contexts, and the phrase may have a different meaning and scope 
depending on the context.”163  Whether an act is taken in an official capacity 
for purposes of conduct-based immunity does not depend on whether it is 
attributable to the state for purposes of state responsibility.164  Nor does it 
depend on whether the act meets the state-action requirement for some 
human rights norms.165  Instead, one must look specifically at how states treat 
the concept of official capacity in the context of conduct-based immunity. 
One must also choose the proper baseline from which to evaluate the state 
practice.166  Some analyses start from a baseline of immunity and look for 
state practice and opinio juris establishing exceptions.167  Others, including 
 
 163. William S. Dodge, Foreign Official Immunity in the International Law Commission:  
The Meanings of Official Capacity, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 156, 157 (2015); see also Zachary 
Douglas, State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials, 82 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 281, 320 (2012) 
(questioning “the assumption that a single definition of ‘official acts’ . . . must be uniformly 
applied across distinct areas of international law”). 
 164. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
art. 58, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (“These articles are without 
prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person 
acting on behalf of a State.”); see also Douglas, supra note 163, at 296 (noting that it is “wrong 
to apply the rules of attribution in state responsibility to determine the scope of state immunity 
for the acts of state officials”); Chimène I. Keitner, Categorizing Acts by State Officials:  
Attribution and Responsibility in the Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 451, 459 (2016) (noting that “the mere attributability of an act to the state is an 
inadequate touchstone, both conceptually and doctrinally, for determining whether a foreign 
official is entitled to claim conduct-based immunity for that act”). 
 165. For example, torture is generally considered a violation of customary international law 
only if there is state involvement. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (defining “torture” for purposes of the convention as pain or suffering “inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity”).  But the “official capacity” that makes torture an 
international crime does not simultaneously confer immunity upon the torturer. Cf. Hafer v. 
Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1991) (rejecting argument that acting under color of state law for 
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simultaneously immunizes the defendant from suit under that 
provision). 
 166. See Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity and the “Baseline” Problem,  
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 605, 606–07 (2011) (distinguishing two baselines for conduct-based 
immunity); see also William S. Dodge, A Modest Approach to the Customary International 
Law of Jurisdiction, 32 EUR. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing different baselines for 
adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction under customary international law).  Immunity 
statutes, like the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, typically begin with a default rule of 
immunity that is subject to enumerated exceptions.  But this drafting choice does not 
necessarily reflect opinio juris. 
 167. See Sean D. Murphy, Immunity Ratione Materiae of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction:  Where is the State Practice in Support of Exceptions?, 112 AJIL 
UNBOUND 4 (2018); Ingrid Wuerth, Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 731, 
743 (2012) (asking “whether national court litigation reflects either state practice or opinio 
juris demonstrating a human rights exception to immunity”). 
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the present authors, start from a baseline of jurisdiction and look for state 
practice and opinio juris establishing a customary international law 
requirement of immunity.168  The latter approach is more consistent with how 
U.S. courts have analyzed claims to immunity since the founding era.169  As 
a policy matter, it is also more consistent with the post–World War II 
recognition that state officials can bear personal responsibility under 
international law for egregious conduct, even if the state itself is also legally 
responsible for the same conduct.170  An approach that equates the official’s 
immunity with the state’s immunity in all cases, absent an explicit waiver by 
the foreign state, rests on an outdated conception of state action that erases 
the individual actor’s moral agency.171  Such an approach also undermines 
the ability of foreign courts to enforce universally accepted rules of conduct 
where forum law would otherwise permit adjudication.172 
Although full consideration of how baselines work in customary 
international law is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) appears to have proceeded from a 
baseline of no immunity in its foundational Jurisdictional Immunities 
decision, which involved foreign state immunity.173  The question in that case 
 
 168. See Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens:  A Critique of 
the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 744 (2003) (“[A]s a fundamental 
matter, state immunity operates as an exception to the principle of adjudicatory jurisdiction.”); 
Rosalyn Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT’L 
L. REV. 265, 271 (1982) (“It is sovereign immunity which is the exception to jurisdiction and 
not jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic rule of immunity.”); Lorna McGregor, 
Torture and State Immunity:  Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
903, 912 (2007) (characterizing immunity as “an exception to the jurisdiction of the forum 
state”). 
 169. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) 
(“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. 
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.”). 
 170. See Formulation of Nürnberg Principles, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 
181, 192, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (“The fact that a person who committed an 
act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible 
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.”); see 
also Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2669, 2694 n.155 (2011) (noting the International Law Commission’s position that state 
responsibility does not exclude individual responsibility). 
 171. Lady Fox has called this the “classical” view, which “imputes the act solely to the 
State, who alone is responsible for its consequences.” HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE 
IMMUNITY 455 (2d ed. 2008).  As ICJ Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal have noted, 
“[t]he increasing recognition of the importance of ensuring that the perpetrators of serious 
international crimes do not go unpunished has had its impact on the immunities which high 
State dignitaries enjoyed under traditional customary law.” Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 63, ¶ 74 (Feb. 
14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal). 
 172. This is important because, as Fox and Webb have noted, “without the possibility of 
criminal prosecution in national courts, in the majority of cases the international law principle 
of no immunity for the commission of international crimes becomes a dead letter lacking 
enforcement.” FOX & WEBB, supra note 158, at 573; see also Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 78 
(joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal) (noting that the 
unlikelihood of trial in an official’s own country and the rarity of prosecutions by international 
criminal tribunals make proceedings in a foreign court “[t]he only credible alternative”). 
 173. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 97 (Feb. 3). 
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was whether customary international law requires according a foreign state 
immunity from suit in another country’s domestic courts based on the acts of 
the foreign state’s armed forces during armed conflict.  The court began with 
the classic distinction between private or commercial acts (acta jure 
gestionis) and public acts (acta jure imperii).  It noted that the acts by 
Germany’s armed forces during World War II “clearly constituted acta jure 
imperii”174 and that “States are generally entitled to immunity in respect of 
acta jure imperii.”175  But the ICJ’s decision did not rest on that 
generalization.  Instead, it looked specifically at state practice and opinio 
juris—the necessary ingredients of customary international law—with 
respect to the conduct of a foreign state’s armed forces during armed 
conflict.176  It concluded that customary international law required immunity 
because it found both of these elements for the specific acts in question. 
If one begins with a baseline of no immunity, then there is insufficient state 
practice and opinio juris to establish that conduct-based foreign official 
immunity applies to violations of the universally accepted prohibitions on 
torture, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, even if the 
foreign state itself would be immune from suit for the same acts.177  This is 
not to say that there is a more general jus cogens exception that applies after 
immunity has already attached.178  But whether immunity has attached and 
whether there is an exception to immunity after it has attached are separate 
questions.179  Conduct-based immunity attaches only to acts taken in an 
official capacity, which does not include all acts performed under color of 
law or authorized by the foreign state.  To the contrary, many decisions have 
 
 174. Id. ¶ 60. 
 175. Id. ¶ 61. 
 176. Id. ¶¶ 65–77.  Of the nine states with territorial tort exceptions in their immunities 
statutes, the court found that two expressly excluded armed forces and that the other seven 
had not be called upon to apply their exceptions to armed forces during armed conflict. Id. 
¶ 71.  Turning to national court judgments, the court found decisions from France, Slovenia, 
Poland, Belgium, Serbia, Brazil, and Germany, holding that states are entitled to immunity 
from suit based on the acts of their armed forces during armed conflict. Id. ¶¶ 73–75.  Only 
Italy and Greece had allowed such suits, and Greece had subsequently changed its practice. 
Id. ¶ 76.  This extensive practice was accompanied by opinio juris showing that states 
considered this immunity to be required under customary international law. Id. ¶ 77. 
 177. See infra notes 182–99 and accompanying text. 
 178. The ICJ has rejected that argument for both state immunity and head-of-state 
immunity but only after finding that immunity had attached.  In Jurisdictional Immunities, the 
court concluded that the acts of armed forces during armed conflict are entitled to immunity, 
2012 I.C.J. ¶¶ 65–78, before going on to consider the possibility of a jus cogens exception, id. 
¶¶ 92–97.  In Arrest Warrant, the court concluded that foreign ministers are entitled to 
status-based immunity during tenure in office, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 53–55 (Feb. 14), before going on to 
consider the possibility of a jus cogens exception, id. ¶¶ 56–58. 
 179. In dictum, the U.S. Supreme Court recently made precisely this mistake, reading the 
ICJ’s rejection of a jus cogens exception in Jurisdictional Immunities as a conclusion that 
foreign states are entitled to jurisdictional immunity for all human rights violations. See Fed. 
Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 713 (2021).  For discussion, see William S. 
Dodge, The Meaning of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Germany v. Philipp, JUST SEC.  
(Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74598/the-meaning-of-the-supreme-courts-
ruling-in-germany-v-philipp/ [https://perma.cc/7SR8-VCYZ]. 
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not treated violations of these universally accepted prohibitions as official 
acts to which conduct-based immunity attaches. 
State practice during the past few decades has been mixed.  In criminal 
proceedings, some courts and prosecutors have found that former officials 
were entitled to conduct-based immunity even for violations of universally 
accepted prohibitions.180  Most recently, a French court upheld a prosecutor’s 
decision to dismiss criminal charges against former U.S. President George 
W. Bush, former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and other former 
Bush administration officials, reasoning “that the arrest of the people 
transferred to Guantanamo, . . . as well as the treatment which was reserved 
for them, . . . fall within the exercise of the sovereignty of [the United 
States].”181 
On the other hand, a number of courts have denied conduct-based 
immunity for violations of universally accepted prohibitions.182  In addition, 
 
 180. See Letter from Pub. Prosecutor, Paris Ct. of Appeal, to Patrick Baudouin (Feb. 27, 
2008), https://ccrjustice.org/files/Rumsfeld_FrenchCase_%20Prosecutors%20Decision_ 
02_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7ZQ-SBFZ] (affirming Paris prosecutor’s decision to dismiss 
charges against former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld); Jiang Zemin, Decision of 
the Federal Prosecutor General of 24 June 2005, 3 ARP 654/03-2 (Ger.) (dismissing charges 
against the former president of China); Prosecutor v. Hissène Habré, July 4, 2000 (Ct. App. 
Dakar), March 20, 2001 (Court of Cassation) (Senegal), 125 I.L.R. 571–77 (dismissing claims 
against the former president of Chad). 
 181. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Jan. 13, 2021, 
No. 42 ¶ 20 (unofficial English translation), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/ 
attach/2021/01/1-13-21_REDACTED_Unofficial%20Translation%20of%20French% 
20Decision%2013%20Jan%202021.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FGQ-2A4W].  It can be difficult 
to disentangle political considerations from opinio juris in these decisions.  As Fox and Webb 
have noted, “practically and politically, the likelihood of prosecution of former officials of 
senior rank who recently have enjoyed personal immunity continues to be remote.” FOX & 
WEBB, supra note 158, at 574.  Máximo Langer has observed as an empirical matter in the 
criminal context that “universal-jurisdiction-prosecuting states have strong incentives to 
concentrate on defendants who impose low international relations costs because it is only in 
these cases that the political benefits of universal jurisdiction prosecutions and trials tend to 
outweigh the costs.” Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction:  The Political 
Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 
2 (2011).  There is a danger in attributing the weight of opinio juris to political decisions.  
Instead, although the difficulty of gathering evidence in conflict situations means that 
plaintiffs must often rely on doctrines of complicity or command responsibility to establish a 
senior official’s culpability, courts should appropriately consider the degree of attenuation 
between the defendant’s acts and the victim’s injury in determining whether the defendant 
bears personal responsibility under international law. 
 182. In 2017, the International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Immunity of 
State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction identified nine decisions since 1998 as 
denying conduct-based immunity for international crimes. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Report of the 
International Law Commission, Sixty-Ninth Session 179 n.762, U.N. Doc. A/72/10 (2017) 
[hereinafter ILC Report on Sixty-Ninth Session] (draft commentary to Draft Article 7) (citing 
Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 
AC (HL) 147 (appeal taken from Eng.); [Tribunal of First Instance] Re Pinochet (Brussels, 
Nov. 6, 1998, 119 I.L.R. 345, 349 (Belg.); In re Hussein, Oberlandesgericht [Higher Regional 
Court] Cologne, May 16, 2000, No. 2 Zs 1330/99, ¶ 11; In re Bouterse, Hof Amsterdam, Nov. 
20, 2000, NJ 2001, 51, ¶ 4.2, Eng. trans. at 2001 Neth. Y.B. Int’l L., aff’d on other grounds, 
Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], Sept. 18, 2001, NJ 2002, 59, Eng. trans. at 2001 Neth. Y.B. Int’l 
L. 282; H.S.A. v. S.A. (Ariel Sharon), Cour de cassation, Feb. 12, 2003, No. P.02.1139.F, 127 
ILR 110, 123, 42 ILM 596 (2003) (Belg.); H v. Public Prosecutor, Hoge Raad, July 8, 2008, 
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a large number of states have exercised universal jurisdiction in criminal 
proceedings against foreign officials in which claims of conduct-based 
immunity were apparently not raised at all.183  Based on an extensive review 
of state practice,184 Germany’s Federal Court of Justice recently concluded 
that there were “no doubts” that conduct-based immunity did not apply to 
war crimes.185  The reasoning of the cases denying conduct-based immunity 
has varied, but several have specifically concluded that violations of certain 
universally accepted prohibitions cannot be considered acts that are taken in 
an official capacity, to which conduct-based immunity attaches.  In an early 
and important example, the Supreme Court of Israel reasoned in Attorney 
General of Israel v. Eichmann186 that crimes against humanity “are 
completely outside the ‘sovereign’ jurisdiction of the State that ordered or 
ratified their commission, and therefore those who participated in such acts 
must personally account for them and cannot shelter behind the official 
character of their task or mission.”187 
 
No. 07/10063 (E), Int’l L. Domestic Cts. [ILDC] 1017, ¶ 7.2 (Neth.); Lozano v. Italy, Corte 
suprema di cassazione, sez, un., July 24, 2008, No. 31171/2008, ILDC 1085, ¶ 6 (It.); A. v. 
Office of the Public Prosecutor, Bundesstrafgericht [Federal Criminal Court], July 25, 2012, 
No. BB.2011.140 (Switz.); FF v. Director of Public Prosecutions (Prince Nasser case), [2014] 
EWHC (Admin) 3419 (Eng.)).  There is older state practice to the same effect. See Claus 
Kress, Article 98:  Cooperation with Respect to Waiver of Immunity and Consent to Surrender 
¶¶ 54–65, in ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Kai Ambros ed., 4th 
ed. 2021).  Consideration of conduct-based immunity for international crimes at the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly generated a wide range of views by states and no 
consensus. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Sixth Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction 5–10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/722 (June 12, 2018) (summarizing debate over 
conduct-based immunity); see also Janina Barkholdt & Julian Kulaga, Analytical Presentation 
of the Comments and Observations by States on Draft Article 7, Paragraph 1, of the ILC Draft 
Articles on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, United Nations 
General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 2017, at 14 (Berlin Potsdam Rsch. Grp.,  
Working Paper No. 14, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3172104 
[https://perma.cc/VG9F-XAPR] (reproducing comments and analyzing them). 
 183. See generally TRIAL INT’L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION ANNUAL REVIEW 2021 (2021), 
https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/ujar-2021/ [https://perma.cc/7GJY-R25V]; Máximo 
Langer & Mackensie Eason, The Quiet Expansion of Universal Jurisdiction, 30 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 779 (2019).  Professor Ingrid Wuerth has argued that cases in which conduct-based 
immunity was not raised should not count as state practice because the forum state is obligated 
to confer conduct-based immunity only if it is invoked by the foreign official’s own state, but 
she acknowledges that state practice on the invocation requirement is mixed. Wuerth, supra 
note 167, at 745, 756. 
 184. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 28, 2021,  
3 StR 564/19, ¶¶ 18–33, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/ 
document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=116372&pos=0&anz=1 [https://perma.cc/XU7U-
NDLP]. 
 185. Id. ¶ 56.  This “no doubts” language is not simply rhetorical because the Federal Court 
of Justice would have been required to refer the question to the Federal Constitutional Court 
if such doubts had existed. See id. ¶¶ 50–55.  For further discussion, see Claus Kress, On 
Functional Immunity of Foreign Officials and Crimes Under International Law, JUST SEC. 
(Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/75596/on-functional-immunity-of-foreign-
officials-and-crimes-under-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/TYA6-CVRV]. 
 186. 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962). 
 187. Id. at 309–10; see also A. v. Off. of Pub. Prosecutor, Bundesstrafgericht [Federal 
Criminal Court], July 25, 2012, No. BB.2011.140, ¶ 5.4.3 (Switz.) (“[I]t would be difficult to 
admit that conduct contrary to fundamental values of the international legal order can be 
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The lack of a requirement to grant immunity from criminal prosecution 
should establish the same for civil proceedings.188  But even if one looks 
separately at state practice in civil cases, there is no general and consistent 
practice of states treating violations of these universally accepted 
prohibitions as acts entitled to conduct-based immunity.  Most of the cases 
commonly cited to support conduct-based immunity in the civil context 
involved situations where state immunity had been extended to foreign 
officials by statute.189  The question in these cases was not, therefore, 
whether customary international law requires conduct-based immunity for 
the alleged acts but rather whether customary international law requires an 
exception to immunity that the state has chosen to extend.  These are 
fundamentally different questions.190  There appear to be only a handful of 
decisions holding that foreign officials were entitled to conduct-based 
immunity from civil proceedings for violations of universally accepted 
prohibitions in the absence of a statute granting such immunity.191  On the 
other hand, a series of U.S. decisions has held that such violations cannot be 
considered official acts entitled to conduct-based immunity.192  As in the 
 
protected by rules of that very same legal order.”); In re Bouterse, Hof Amsterdam, Nov. 20, 
2000, NJ 2001, ¶ 4.2 (noting that “the commission of very serious offences as are concerned 
here—cannot be considered to be one of the official duties of a head of state”). 
 188. Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 848 (2011) (“If there is no immunity from criminal proceedings, then it 
is not clear as a doctrinal matter why there would nevertheless be immunity from civil 
proceedings for the same conduct.”); see also Douglas, supra note 163, at 301–04 (arguing 
that there is no proper basis for distinguishing civil and criminal proceedings with respect to 
the immunity of state officials); Kress, supra note 185 (noting the difficulty of distinguishing 
criminal and civil proceedings for purposes of conduct-based immunity). 
 189. See Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26; 
Propend Finance Ltd. v. Sing (1997) 111 I.L.R. 611 (Eng. & Wales Ct. App.); Jaffe v. Miller 
(1993) 5 O.R. 2d 133 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Zhang v. Zemin (2010) NSWCA 255 (Austl.); see 
also Jones v. United Kingdom, 2014-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.  National statutes extending state 
immunity to jus cogens violations are themselves state practice, but such statutes contribute 
to the development of customary international law only if accompanied by a sense of legal 
obligation (opinio juris), which would need to be determined on a statute-by-statute basis.  As 
the ICJ observed in Jurisdictional Immunities, “[s]tates sometimes decide to accord an 
immunity more extensive than that required by international law,” but “the grant of immunity 
in such a case is not accompanied by the requisite opinio juris and therefore sheds no light 
upon [customary international law].” Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), 2012 
I.C.J. 97, ¶ 55 (Feb. 3). 
 190. For further discussion, see William S. Dodge, Is Torture an “Official Act”?:  
Reflections on Jones v. United Kingdom, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/15/guest-post-dodge-torture-official-act-reflections-jones-v-
united-kingdom/ [https://perma.cc/YK2M-B6N2]. 
 191. See Case C/09/554385/HAZA18/647, Judgment (Hague Dist. Ct. 2020) (Neth.), 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2020:667#_3d669af
3-966f-40db-ba3a-4a53baab9313 [https://perma.cc/LW2B-FEY7]; Fang v. Jiang, [2007] 
NZAR 420 (N.Z.). 
 192. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 776 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[A]s a matter of 
international and domestic law, jus cogens violations are, by definition, acts that are not 
officially authorized by the Sovereign.”); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 
2005) (discussing prior cases and concluding that “officials receive no immunity for acts that 
violate international jus cogens human rights norms (which by definition are not legally 
authorized acts)”); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding 
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criminal context, mixed practice does not amount to a general and consistent 
practice accompanied by opinio juris, which is what one needs to establish a 
clear requirement of conduct-based immunity for such violations. 
Outside the human rights context, one finds other examples of conduct 
authorized by foreign governments that is not entitled to conduct-based 
immunity.  The classic example is espionage,193 but authorities today 
typically include sabotage, kidnapping, and political assassination, 
as well.194  “In such cases, the courts have denied immunity, despite 
recognizing the person concerned as a State official and establishing a 
connection between the State of the official and the act in question.”195  Some 
authorities emphasize the fact that these activities typically occur within the 
 
that “Marcos’ acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly acts outside of his 
authority as President”).  Some U.S. courts have concluded that there is no jus cogens 
exception to foreign official immunity, but their reasoning presumed that such immunity had 
already attached. See, e.g., Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d 888, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2019); Matar v. 
Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 193. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 28, 2021, 3 StR 564/19, 
¶ 47 (Ger.) (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 
15, 1995, 92 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 277, 321) (“There is 
no general rule of international law according to which spies who are criminally prosecuted 
by the state affected by the spying can invoke the principles of state immunity.”); Prosecutor 
v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108, Appeals Chamber Decision, ¶ 41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997) (“[Spies], although acting as State organs, may be held 
personally accountable for their wrongdoing.”); see also HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE 
LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 97 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that “the victim State is entitled in 
international law to prosecute the individual spies”); Ingrid Delupis, Foreign Warships and 
Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 63 (1984) (noting that spies “enjoy no 
protection by their home state and no immunity for their acts”).  The United States continues 
to prosecute foreign officials for espionage. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Evgeny 
Buryakov Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court in Connection with Conspiracy to Work 
for Russian Intelligence (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/evgeny-
buryakov-pleads-guilty-manhattan-federal-court-connection-conspiracy-work 
[https://perma.cc/NFJ6-NDF9]. 
 194. FOX & WEBB, supra note 193, at 97 (referring to “espionage, acts of sabotage, [and] 
kidnapping”); Int’l L. Comm’n, Fifth Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction, ¶ 227, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/701 (June 14, 2016) [hereinafter ILC Fifth 
Report] (referring to “political assassination, espionage or sabotage”).  With respect to 
sabotage, the leading example is New Zealand’s prosecution of French agents for sinking the 
Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Immunity of State Officials from 
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction:  Memorandum by the Secretariat ¶ 162 n.465, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter ILC Secretariat Memo] (discussing the Rainbow 
Warrior case).  With respect to kidnapping, see id. ¶ 163 n.466 (discussing Italy’s prosecution 
of U.S. CIA agents for the abduction of Abu Omar); Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge of the 
German Federal Court [2011] EWHC 2029 ¶¶ 86–101 (U.K.) (denying conduct-based 
immunity to Mongolian official charged with kidnapping). 
 195. ILC Fifth Report, supra note 194, ¶ 227.  Foreign states do not assert foreign official 
immunity in such cases even when the foreign states acknowledge responsibility for the acts 
of their agents. See ILC Secretariat Memo, supra note 194, ¶ 162 n.465 (noting that France 
accepted responsibility for sabotage in the Rainbow Warrior case but did not assert immunity); 
Delupis, supra note 193, at 65–66 (noting that the United States accepted responsibility for 
espionage in the Francis Gary Powers case but did not assert immunity); see also Int’l L. 
Comm’n, Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 
¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (June 10, 2010) [hereinafter ILC Second Report] (noting that in 
cases of “espionage, acts of sabotage, [and] kidnapping . . . immunity has either been asserted 
but not accepted, or not even asserted”). 
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territory of the victim state and view such cases as supporting a “territorial 
tort exception” to conduct-based immunity.196  But prosecutions have 
occurred for acts of espionage outside the victim state’s own territory,197 and 
the relevance of territory is diminishing as sabotage and spying move 
online.198  The principle that spies cannot “invoke the principles of state 
immunity” is often stated in broad terms without territorial limitations,199 and 
the broader principle finds support in state practice.200 
In sum, conduct-based immunity does not attach to everything foreign 
officials do.  First, it does not attach to acts that were not authorized by the 
official’s government.  Second, it does not attach to certain acts that were 
authorized by the foreign official’s government, including espionage and 
violations of the universally accepted prohibitions on torture, genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity.  Many states have denied 
conduct-based immunity to such acts.  Thus, there is no general and 
consistent state practice and opinio juris establishing that such acts must be 
considered “acts taken in an official capacity” for purposes of conduct-based 
immunity. 
III.  THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Given the evolving landscape of foreign official immunity, one of the most 
important—and most contested—questions is the proper role of the executive 
branch in making case-specific immunity determinations and in articulating 
principles of conduct-based immunity for courts to apply.  The State 
Department claims broad authority to do both.  In a recent amicus brief 
 
 196. See, e.g., ILC Fifth Report, supra note 194, ¶¶ 225–229 (discussing “territorial tort 
exception”); ILC Second Report, supra note 195, ¶ 81 (considering exception when “a crime 
is perpetrated in the territory of the State which exercises jurisdiction”); FOX & WEBB, supra 
note 158, at 97 (considering territorial exception). 
 197. See, e.g., United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that the 
U.S. Espionage Act applied to East German spy for acts of espionage in Mexico and East 
Germany). 
 198. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection 
with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in 
Cyberspace (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-
connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and [https://perma.cc/ZP45-M9L7]; 
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Chinese Military Personnel Charged with Computer Fraud, 
Economic Espionage and Wire Fraud for Hacking into Credit Reporting Agency Equifax  
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-military-personnel-charged-
computer-fraud-economic-espionage-and-wire-fraud-hacking [https://perma.cc/S5XX-
Q348]; Press Release, Dep’t of Just., U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber 
Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage 
(May 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-
cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor [https://perma.cc/DR3G-PGE3]. 
 199. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 28, 2021, 3 StR 
564/19, ¶ 47 (Ger.). 
 200. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.  Because of the virtually absolute 
nature of diplomatic immunity, see supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text, spying by 
diplomats is punished by expulsion. See Delupis, supra note 193, at 63 (“There is ample state 
practice that the diplomat in such circumstances is declared persona non grata and expelled.”). 
710 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
recommending a grant of certiorari in Mutond v. Lewis,201 the United States 
said: 
Under this Court’s decisions, the principles recognized by the Executive 
Branch governing foreign-official immunity are to be followed by the 
courts.  That is true not only in cases in which the Executive files a 
suggestion of immunity, but also in cases in which courts must decide for 
themselves whether a foreign official is immune from suit.202 
Although the State Department’s role confirming a foreign official’s 
entitlement to status-based immunity is well accepted, the executive branch’s 
assertion of lawmaking authority over conduct-based immunity remains 
contested in the post-Samantar era.203 
The State Department bases its claims of authority on the legal regime for 
deciding questions of state immunity established by the Supreme Court in Ex 
parte Peru204 and Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman.205  As described above, 
the Samantar Court described this regime as “a two-step procedure.”206  
First, if a foreign sovereign requested immunity from the State Department 
and “the request was granted, the district court surrendered its 
jurisdiction.”207  Second, “‘in the absence of recognition of the immunity by 
the Department of State,’ a district court ‘had authority to decide for itself 
whether all the requisites for such immunity existed’” under the policy 
established by the Department of State.208  As Samantar noted, “the same 
two-step procedure was typically followed when a foreign official asserted 
immunity,” although such cases were “rare.”209  The FSIA replaced this 
regime with respect to foreign state immunity.210  But the Samantar Court 
 
 201. 141 S. Ct. 156 (2020). 
 202. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Mutond, 141 S. Ct. 156 (2020) 
(No. 19-185) [hereinafter U.S. Mutond Amicus Brief]; see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 
16-56704) [hereinafter U.S. Doğan Amicus Brief].  The Supreme Court denied review in 
Mutond. 141 S. Ct. 156 (2020).  It appears that the executive branch claims the authority to 
bind courts only with respect to foreign official immunities that are governed by federal 
common law.  With respect to treaty-based immunity, the executive has argued that its 
interpretation of the VCDR is “entitled to great weight.” Letter Brief of the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 2, Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2019) (No. 
19-236) [hereinafter Broidy Letter Brief].  But the executive’s argument for diplomatic 
immunity in Broidy did not claim that the court was bound by either its interpretation of the 
VCDR or its views on how the treaty should be applied to the facts. See id. at 7–15. 
 203. Compare Yelin, supra note 37 (arguing that the executive branch has lawmaking 
authority over head-of-state immunity), with Wuerth, supra note 6, at 964–65 (arguing that 
the executive branch lacks lawmaking authority over foreign official immunity). 
 204. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
 205. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
 206. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 311–12 (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 587). 
 209. Id. at 312.  A compilation of immunity determinations from 1952 to 1977 identified 
six decisions involving the immunity of foreign officials. Sovereign Immunity Decisions, 
supra note 52, at 1020.  The State Department continued to make some determinations of 
foreign official immunity after the enactment of the FSIA in 1976. See Yelin, supra note 37, 
at 991–96 (listing head-of-state decisions). 
 210. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312–13. 
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saw “no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to 
eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding individual 
official immunity.”211  The immunity of foreign officials, the Court 
concluded, “is properly governed by the common law.”212 
Although the executive branch reads Samantar as endorsing its “historical 
authority to determine the immunity of foreign officials,”213 Professor Ingrid 
Wuerth has suggested that the better reading is the more literal one—that 
“Congress did not seek to do anything with respect to individual immunity 
cases, either to authorize or eliminate the practice.”214  The more pertinent 
question is whether the Supreme Court today would, or should, endorse the 
regime established in Ex parte Peru and Hoffman.215  There are substantial 
separation of powers concerns raised by the executive branch’s claim of 
exclusive authority over conduct-based immunity determinations,216 and the 
Roberts Court has been less deferential to the executive in foreign affairs than 
some of its predecessors.217 
Even without a regime of absolute deference, the executive branch would 
still have considerable influence over questions of foreign official immunity.  
First, the executive branch has constitutional authority to determine 
conclusively who holds the offices that are entitled to head-of-state 
immunity, determinations that are essentially dispositive for status-based 
immunity.218  Second, the executive branch can interpret the international 
law rules governing foreign official immunity.  For treaty-based immunities, 
it is well established that the executive’s interpretation of the relevant treaties 
“is entitled to great weight.”219  The same should be true for the executive’s 
interpretation of immunities based on customary international law.220  The 
State Department has substantial expertise on questions of customary 
international law, and courts would likely defer to its analysis of state practice 
and opinio juris in developing federal common law.  But executive 
determinations of foreign official immunity typically assert without further 
explanation or analysis that the State Department’s principles of foreign 
 
 211. Id. at 323. 
 212. Id. at 325. 
 213. U.S. Mutond Amicus Brief, supra note 202, at 11. 
 214. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 939–40. 
 215. Cf. id. at 921 (arguing that “the decisions in Ex Parte Peru and Hoffman were wrongly 
reasoned—if not wrongly decided”). 
 216. See infra notes 224, 234 and accompanying text. 
 217. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust:  Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts 
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 384 (2015); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The 
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1930–31 (2015). 
 218. See infra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
 219. Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 442 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)) (referring to the VCDR). 
 220. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 102, § 112 cmt. c (“Courts give particular 
weight to the position taken by the United States Government on questions of international 
law because it is deemed desirable that so far as possible the United States speak with one 
voice on such matters.”); see also Wuerth, supra note 6, at 971 (arguing that “deference may 
be appropriate to the executive branch where international law is uncertain or in a state of 
flux”). 
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official immunity have been “informed by customary international law,”221 
without offering further explanation or analysis.  By omitting the underlying 
analysis from its submissions, the executive branch has effectively forfeited 
its substantial power to persuade courts to adopt its interpretation of 
customary international law. 
This part affirms that the executive branch’s determinations with respect 
to the status of foreign officials are binding on courts and that courts should 
give substantial deference to the executive’s interpretation of the 
international law rules governing immunity.  But it also emphasizes that 
neither the executive’s suggestions of immunity in specific cases nor its 
articulation of principles are binding on courts.  In the end, courts are 
responsible both for developing foreign official immunity as federal common 
law and applying those rules in specific cases. 
A.  Executive Suggestions of Immunity 
The executive branch sometimes files suggestions of immunity or 
nonimmunity in individual cases.  It has taken the position in recent decades 
that “courts are required to defer to the Executive Branch’s suggestion of 
immunity on behalf of a foreign official named as a defendant in a civil suit 
in the United States.”222 
U.S. courts do treat executive branch determinations of head-of-state 
immunity (which covers heads of state, heads of government, and foreign 
ministers) as conclusive.223  This makes sense because the executive has the 
constitutional authority to determine whom the United States recognizes as 
holding those offices.224  As Professor Wuerth has explained, “[b]ecause 
status-based immunity . . . follows almost always as a matter of course from 
these determinations, courts will rarely have a role to play in head of state 
and other status-based immunity cases.”225  But the executive branch asserts 
not just that its determinations of status are controlling in head-of-state cases, 
but that its determinations of immunity are controlling.  Thus, the executive 
claims the authority to deny immunity to a sitting head of state in a particular 
 
 221. Letter from Legal Adviser Brian J. Egan to Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Benjamin C. Mizer (June 10, 2016), Doğan v. Barak, 2016 WL 6024416 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 
2016) [hereinafter Doğan Letter] (referring to “principles of immunity articulated by the 
Executive Branch in the exercise of its constitutional authority over foreign affairs and 
informed by customary international law”). 
 222. U.S. Doğan Amicus Brief, supra note 202, at 1. 
 223. See, e.g., Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Yousuf v. 
Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 772 (4th Cir. 2012); Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 626 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
 224. See Keitner, supra note 52, at 71 (“Courts should treat Executive representations about 
status-based immunity as conclusive because they are a function of the Executive’s power 
under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution to accredit diplomats (‘receive ambassadors’) 
and, by implication, to recognize foreign heads of state.”); see also Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 772 
(“The Constitution assigns the power to ‘receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers’ to 
the Executive Branch, U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, which includes, by implication, the power to 
accredit diplomats and recognize foreign heads of state.”); Sikhs for Justice v. Singh, 64 
F. Supp. 3d 190, 194 (D.D.C. 2014) (similar). 
 225. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 971. 
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case.226  There are good reasons to doubt that the executive’s authority 
extends so far.  In the context of foreign state immunity, the Supreme Court 
has held that the recognition of a foreign government and its representatives 
is “conclusive on all domestic courts,” but it has been careful to maintain that 
courts “are free to draw for themselves [the] legal consequences [of 
recognition] in litigations pending before them.”227  Additionally, to the 
extent that customary international law requires head-of-state immunity, the 
executive’s denial of such immunity would raise difficult questions about the 
president’s constitutional authority to violate international law without 
congressional authorization.228 
Courts are divided on whether executive determinations of conduct-based 
immunity are conclusive.  The Second Circuit has held that State Department 
determinations of conduct-based immunity are controlling,229 whereas the 
Fourth Circuit has held that they are “not controlling” but carry “substantial 
weight.”230  The latter position is the better reasoned one.  As the Fourth 
Circuit explained in Yousuf: 
Unlike head-of-state immunity and other status-based immunities, there is 
no equivalent constitutional basis suggesting that the views of the 
Executive Branch control questions of [conduct-based] immunity.  Such 
cases do not involve any act of recognition for which the Executive Branch 
is constitutionally empowered; rather, they simply involve matters about 
the scope of defendant’s official duties.231 
As discussed above, the question of whether an act is taken in an “official 
capacity” for immunity purposes turns on questions of foreign law, U.S. law, 
and international law, as well as on questions of fact.  While the State 
Department has expertise on questions of international law,232 it is not better 
equipped than courts to interpret foreign or U.S. law, or to find or analyze 
facts.  The executive branch roots its constitutional claim to issue binding 
case-specific suggestions of conduct-based immunity in its power to conduct 
foreign affairs.233  As a practical matter, however, the United States’s 
 
 226. See U.S. Miango Suggestion, supra note 122, at 2 n.4 (“The fact that the Executive 
Branch has the constitutional power to suggest the immunity of a sitting head of state does not 
mean that it will do so in every case.”).  To our knowledge, the executive has never determined 
that a sitting head of state, head of government, or foreign minister is not entitled to immunity, 
although it has prosecuted individuals that it does not recognize as legitimate heads of state. 
See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 227. Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 138 (1938). 
 228. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 229. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Rosenberg v. Pasha, 577 
F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2014) (reaffirming Matar). 
 230. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Warfaa v. Ali, 811 
F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2016) (reaffirming Yousuf); Miango v. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, No. 15-1265, 2020 WL 3498586, at *5 n.2 (D.D.C. June 29, 2020) (quoting Yousuf, 
699 F.3d at 773).  The Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide “the level of deference 
owed to the State Department’s suggestion of immunity.” Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d 888, 893 
(9th Cir. 2019). 
 231. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773. 
 232. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 233. U.S. Mutond Amicus Brief, supra note 202, at 13. 
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experience with immunity from the founding to the period before enactment 
of the FSIA shows that case-specific executive authority leads to political 
pressure, inconsistent determinations, and harm to U.S. foreign relations.  
Moreover, allowing the executive branch to dictate the outcome of specific 
cases would raise separation of powers concerns.234  Although the Supreme 
Court has suggested in the context of foreign state immunity that the State 
Department’s case-specific views “might well be entitled to deference as the 
considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign 
policy,”235 Justice Kennedy noted in dissent that “judicial independence 
[would be] compromised by case-by-case, selective determinations of 
jurisdiction by the Executive.”236  Outside the context of immunity, the 
Supreme Court has generally resisted giving the executive branch 
case-specific authority.237 
B.  Executive Articulations of Principles 
If the United States does not file a suggestion of immunity or 
nonimmunity, courts must make their own immunity determinations.  The 
U.S. government has argued that, in this situation, courts must still follow the 
principles of foreign official immunity articulated by the executive branch, 
discerned and distilled from its submissions in other cases.238  Indeed, the 
government has taken the position that “courts have no authority to create 
federal common-law principles of foreign-official immunity, absent 
Executive Branch guidance.”239  In practice, status-based immunity has 
posed little difficulty, both because the State Department generally certifies 
the defendant’s entitlement to immunity in such cases and because the 
principles of immunity are clear.  In the few instances when no suggestion 
has been filed, courts have determined the official’s status for themselves and 
have granted or denied head-of-state immunity accordingly.240 
 
 234. See Keitner, supra note 52, at 72; see also Bradley, supra note 14, at 7 (noting 
“potential separation of powers concerns”). 
 235. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004). 
 236. Id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 237. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 408 
(1990) (rejecting U.S. argument to resolve act of state case based on case-specific views of 
State Department); see also William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2132–40 (2015) (discussing the role of the executive under 
international comity doctrines). 
 238. U.S. Mutond Amicus Brief, supra note 202, at 11 (“Under this Court’s decisions, the 
principles recognized by the Executive Branch governing foreign-official immunity are to be 
followed by the courts.”). 
 239. U.S. Doğan Amicus Brief, supra note 202, at 25. 
 240. See, e.g., Weiming Chen v. Ying-jeou Ma, No. 12-5232, 2013 WL 4437607, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013) (granting head-of-state immunity for the president of Taiwan); 
Gomes v. ANGOP, Angola Press Agency, No. 11-0580, 2012 WL 3637453, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 22, 2012) (granting head-of-state immunity for the president of Angola); Smith v. Ghana 
Com. Bank, Ltd., No. 10-4655, 2012 WL 2930462, at *8 (D. Minn. June 18, 2012) (granting 
head-of-state immunity for the president of Ghana); Hassen v. Nahyan, No. 09-01106, 2010 
WL 9538408, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (denying head-of-state immunity for the crown 
prince of the United Arab Emirates). 
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Identifying the principles governing conduct-based immunity has posed a 
greater challenge.  In practice, courts have looked to sources other than the 
executive branch for the principles to apply.241  But they have not always 
looked in the right places.  In Doğan v. Barak,242 for example, although the 
State Department suggested conduct-based immunity for a former Israeli 
defense minister, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless performed its own legal 
analysis.243  In doing so, the court looked to section 66(f) of the Restatement 
(Second), a provision not cited in the U.S. amicus brief.244  In Lewis v. 
Mutond,245 the State Department did not file a suggestion, and the D.C. 
Circuit also looked to the Restatement (Second) rather than to previous 
executive branch filings, although only because the parties agreed 
(incorrectly) that section 66(f) governed.246  The United States urged the 
Supreme Court to grant review of the decision, arguing that section 66(f) 
“contradicts the principles of foreign-official immunity long advanced by the 
Executive Branch.”247  Setting aside the question of section 66(f)’s 
obsolescence, discussed above, the key point here is that courts do not seem 
to understand Samantar as requiring them to follow the principles for 
conduct-based immunity articulated by the executive branch. 
Some courts have also charted their own course on the question of whether 
a foreign official can claim conduct-based immunity for violating a jus 
cogens norm of international law, such as torture or genocide.  In Yousuf, on 
remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar, the State 
Department filed a suggestion of nonimmunity.248  Because the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that this determination was “not controlling,”249 it 
performed its own legal analysis.  Looking to both foreign and U.S. 
decisions, the court concluded “that, under international and domestic law, 
officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign-official immunity for 
jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant’s 
official capacity.”250  Although the court reached the same result as the 
United States, its rationale for denying conduct-based immunity was 
 
 241. See Bellinger & Wirth, supra note 126, at 449 n.105 (“Notwithstanding the executive 
branch’s insistence that courts rely on its statements in prior cases, courts have 
overwhelmingly relied on the cases themselves, not the executive branch’s submissions.”). 
 242. 932 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 243. Id. at 893–94. 
 244. Id. at 894. 
 245. 918 F.3d 142 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 246. Id. at 146. 
 247. U.S. Mutond Amicus Brief, supra note 202, at 8–9.  Specifically, the United States 
argued that the D.C. Circuit had erroneously adopted “a ‘categorical rule’ of non-immunity in 
personal-capacity suits against foreign officials.” Id. at 9. 
 248. Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 777 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 249. Id. at 773. 
 250. Id. at 777; see also Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661 (4th Cir. 2016) (following 
Yousuf’s holding that conduct-based immunity does not apply to jus cogens violations); Omari 
v. Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone Auth., No. 16-3895, 2017 WL 3896399, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 18, 2017) (“Conduct-based foreign official immunity . . . may be held not to apply when 
the official’s conduct violates peremptory norms of international law, known as jus cogens.” 
(citing Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 775–78)). 
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different from the grounds urged by the United States, which focused instead 
on the lack of any recognized government in Somalia that could request 
immunity, as well as the defendant’s status as a U.S. resident.251 
It is perhaps not surprising that courts have asserted their authority to 
develop the rules of foreign official immunity absent a controlling statute or 
treaty because the task of articulating rules of federal common law has 
traditionally fallen to the courts.  Indeed, it is difficult to see where the 
executive branch might get the constitutional authority to articulate legal 
principles of foreign official immunity that are binding on courts.252  Looking 
to the Constitution, Article I states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein 
granted” shall be vested in Congress.253  Congress may, of course, delegate 
lawmaking power to the executive branch, but there is no plausible argument 
that it has done so with respect to foreign official immunity.254  Article II of 
the Constitution gives the president “[t]he executive Power”255 and imposes 
a duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”256  In Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,257 the Supreme Court observed: 
In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the 
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.  
The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the 
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks 
bad.258 
More recently, in Medellín v. Texas,259 the Court rejected the argument that 
the president had authority to assume a lawmaking role to give domestic 
effect to an ICJ decision.260  Referring again to the Take Care Clause, the 
Court noted that “[t]his authority allows the President to execute the laws, 
not make them.”261 
If, as Samantar held, the conduct-based immunity of foreign officials that 
is not covered by existing statutes and treaties “is properly governed by the 
common law,”262 it follows that courts, rather than the executive branch, are 
responsible for making it.263  The common law of foreign official immunity 
 
 251. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 777. 
 252. See generally Wuerth, supra note 6. 
 253. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 254. Wuerth, supra note 6, at 970 (“[T]he FSIA does not delegate power to the executive.  
To the contrary, the statute’s purpose was to restrict the role of the executive branch, at least 
in cases against foreign states.”). 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 256. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 257. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 258. Id. at 587. 
 259. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 260. Id. at 532. 
 261. Id.; see also id. at 527–28 (“As Madison explained in The Federalist No. 47, under 
our constitutional system of checks and balances, ‘[t]he magistrate in whom the whole 
executive power resides cannot of himself make a law.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, 
326 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 262. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010). 
 263. See Wuerth, supra note 6, at 954–67. 
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is generally understood to be federal common law.264  After Erie, federal 
common law is a limited enterprise, but the Supreme Court has recognized 
doctrines of federal common law such as the act of state doctrine in areas of 
strong federal interest.  In Sabbatino, the Court made clear “that an issue 
concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the 
Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other 
members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an 
aspect of federal law.”265  Rules of foreign official immunity fit that 
description. 
This is not to deny that the executive branch will have considerable 
influence over the federal common law of foreign official immunity.  As 
discussed above, courts can and should give substantial deference to State 
Department interpretations of customary international law on foreign official 
immunity.  But in the U.S. constitutional system, the executive branch does 
not make rules of federal common law; federal courts do. 
IV.  PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS 
Apart from the substantive questions of foreign official immunity, courts 
have faced a host of procedural questions in cases against foreign officials, 
with no statutory guidance on how to resolve them.  An overarching 
procedural issue is the extent to which claims of common-law foreign official 
immunity should be treated similarly to claims of foreign state immunity 
under the FSIA.  On some procedural points, the answer is clear.  Samantar 
itself held that the FSIA’s provisions on jurisdiction and service do not apply 
in suits against foreign officials.266  But on other questions of procedure, 
lower courts have treated cases involving foreign official immunity as though 
the FSIA applied, notwithstanding Samantar.  A prime example is their 
treatment of foreign official immunity as a question of subject matter 
jurisdiction, based on a misapplication of the framework created by the 
FSIA.267  Some courts have even adopted an unusual burden-shifting analysis 
for proving foreign official immunity that is based on the legislative history 
 
 264. See United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., 794 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2015); see 
also Bradley, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that scholars have assumed that foreign official 
immunity is “federal common law” and calling the assumption “reasonable”); Wuerth, supra 
note 6, at 964 (noting that “[v]irtually every theorist to specifically consider foreign state or 
official immunity has favored application of some form of federal common law over state 
law”). 
 265. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).  The Supreme Court 
has not looked to the executive branch to articulate rules for the act of state doctrine.  Indeed, 
in Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court rejected the rule suggested by the United States—a rule 
that would have given the executive case-specific authority. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. 
Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 408–09 (1990).  By the same token, the federal 
common law of foreign official immunity is not a discretionary executive branch authority to 
avoid embarrassing cases. Id. 
 266. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 324 n.20 (2010). 
 267. See infra Part IV.A. 
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of the FSIA.268  The result is a procedural mishmash that tethers foreign 
official immunity to a statutory framework that does not fit. 
This part examines a range of procedural questions in light of Samantar’s 
holding that the FSIA does not apply to suits against foreign officials unless 
the requested relief would run against the foreign state.  Part IV.A clarifies 
that suits against foreign officials may only be brought in or removed to 
federal court if an independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists, that the 
plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and that the 
usual federal or state rules for service of process apply.  Part IV.B argues that 
foreign official immunity should be treated as an affirmative defense, rather 
than as a question of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction.  Such 
treatment would not require the foreign official to file an answer, for it is well 
established that a defendant can raise an affirmative defense in a motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment before filing an answer.269  Part IV.C 
discusses how foreign official immunity should be proven.  It argues that the 
defendant should bear the burden of proof, analyzes the weight to be given 
to determinations by the U.S. and foreign governments, and discusses the 
standards for obtaining discovery on matters relevant to immunity.  Part IV.D 
considers alternative grounds for dismissal, noting that it may sometimes be 
easier for a court to dispose of a case on such grounds than to resolve difficult 
questions of foreign official immunity.  Even if foreign official immunity 
were treated as jurisdictional, a court could still dismiss a case on threshold 
grounds, such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal 
jurisdiction, or forum non conveniens.  And if foreign official immunity is 
considered an affirmative defense, rather than a matter of jurisdiction, a court 
could also dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim.  Finally, Part IV.E 
argues that both the grant and the denial of foreign official immunity should 
be immediately appealable.  Taken together, the answers provided in this part 
provide a procedural roadmap for judges faced with claims against foreign 
officials that will allow those judges to resolve questions of immunity 
efficiently at the outset of the case or to avoid such questions by dismissing 
on other grounds.  This will also better enable the United States to comply 
with its obligations under international law to shield current and former 
foreign officials from the burdens of litigation in appropriate circumstances. 
A.  Jurisdiction and Service of Process 
Samantar made one thing clear:  the FSIA’s provisions on jurisdiction and 
service of process do not apply in suits against foreign officials.270  The FSIA 
 
 268. See Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see also infra notes 330–
32 and accompanying text. 
 269. See infra notes 310–11 and accompanying text. 
 270. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 324 n.20 (noting that “a plaintiff seeking to sue a foreign 
official will not be able to rely on the Act’s service of process and jurisdictional provisions”).  
As noted above, this may not be true if a court determines that the foreign state is the “real 
party in interest.” Id. at 325.  When the foreign state is the real party in interest, some courts 
have held that the FSIA’s provisions on service apply. See, e.g., Photos v. People’s Republic 
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gives federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign 
states that fall within an enumerated exception to immunity and provides for 
the removal of civil actions against foreign states from state to federal 
court.271  The FSIA further provides for personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
state in any case where subject matter jurisdiction exists and the foreign state 
has been properly served.272  And the FSIA contains specific rules for service 
of process on foreign states273 and on their agencies or instrumentalities.274  
It might be wise for Congress to give the federal courts an independent basis 
for subject matter jurisdiction over all suits against foreign officials too, but 
with the exception of suits against ambassadors and consuls, it has not done 
so.275 
The fact that the FSIA’s provisions on service and jurisdiction do not apply 
to suits against foreign officials has a number of important implications.  
First, the plaintiff must serve the foreign official with process.  In federal 
court, plaintiffs must rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) for service 
in the United States and on Rule 4(f) for service outside the United States.  
In state court, plaintiffs must rely on state rules for service.  In some cases, 
the fact that the FSIA’s rules on service of process do not apply may be an 
advantage for plaintiffs because the FSIA’s rules can be quite demanding.276  
But the cases show that it can also be difficult to serve a foreign official 
abroad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.277 
Second, the plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign 
official, subject to the limits imposed by the Due Process Clauses.278  Some 
claims against foreign officials arise out of contacts with the United States 
 
of China, No. 20-656, 2020 WL 6889016, at *5–7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2020) (holding that 
service pursuant to FSIA was required because China was the real party in interest). 
 271. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d).  The FSIA’s legislative history shows that Congress 
sought “to encourage the bringing of actions against foreign states in Federal courts” and to 
permit removal “[i]n view of the potential sensitivity of actions against foreign states and the 
importance of developing a uniform body of law in this area.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 13, 
32 (1978), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6612, 6631. 
 272. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).  Courts have held that due process limits on personal jurisdiction 
do not apply to foreign states or to state-owned corporations that are agents of foreign states, 
see Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399–400 
(2d Cir. 2009), but that such limits do apply to state-owned corporations that operate 
independently, see GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 273. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). 
 274. Id. § 1608(b). 
 275. See id. § 1251(b)(1) (giving the U.S. Supreme Court original, but not exclusive, 
jurisdiction over actions “to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice 
consuls of foreign states are parties”); id. § 1351 (giving district courts jurisdiction, exclusive 
of state courts, over consuls and members of a mission (including ambassadors) or their 
families). 
 276. See, e.g., Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1062 (2019); Transaero, 
Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 277. See Strange on Behalf of Strange v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 964 F.3d 1190, 1193–
96 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (discussing plaintiff’s difficulties in serving former Afghan President 
Karzai under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)). 
 278. See Doe 1 v. Buratai, No. 18-7170, 2019 WL 668339, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2019) 
(holding that a foreign official “lacked sufficient contacts with the United States to justify the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). 
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and therefore support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.279  But in 
other cases, the court is unlikely to have general personal jurisdiction unless 
the defendant can be served with process in the United States.280  Lack of 
personal jurisdiction will be a substantial barrier to suit in many cases against 
foreign officials. 
Third, if a case is to be brought in or removed to federal court, there must 
be an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.  Suits under 
federal statutes, such as the TVPA, will fall within the grant of federal 
question jurisdiction,281 and suits by U.S. citizens could fall within the grant 
of diversity jurisdiction.282  But under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a 
foreign official’s anticipated or actual assertion of an immunity defense 
under federal common law does not confer federal jurisdiction either as an 
original matter or for purposes of removal.283 
B.  Pleading Immunity 
Another set of important procedural questions concerns how claims of 
foreign official immunity should be pleaded.  This part argues that courts 
should treat foreign official immunity as an affirmative defense, rather than 
as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.  Such a change in approach would 
answer some difficult questions about how foreign official immunity works 
in federal and state courts and account for the fact that such immunity can be 
waived.  Characterization as an affirmative defense would still allow foreign 
official immunity to be treated as a threshold issue that protects defendants 
from the burdens of litigation. 
Since Samantar, federal courts have treated foreign official immunity as a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction, following the path worn by cases 
applying the FSIA.284  Some courts have strangely relied on pre-Samantar 
decisions applying the FSIA to foreign officials to support their view of 
 
 279. See, e.g., Miango v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-1265, 2020 WL 
3498586 (D.D.C. June 29, 2020) (alleging that plaintiffs were beaten by defendants in 
Washington, D.C.). 
 280. See generally Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding general personal 
jurisdiction on the basis of service while the defendant was temporarily present within the 
forum). 
 281. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 282. Id. § 1332(a)(2). 
 283. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). 
 284. See, e.g., Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Isr., 919 F.3d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The 
district court properly dismissed all claims against the Israeli Officials for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because, as foreign government officials acting their official capacity, they 
are entitled to immunity.”); Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (reviewing 
district court’s dismissal on grounds of foreign official immunity for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction); Miango v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-1265, 2019 WL 2191806, 
at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2019) (dismissing claims against foreign head of state for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction).  Some courts have similarly treated diplomatic immunity as going to 
subject matter jurisdiction. See Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 443 (2d 
Cir. 2019). 
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foreign official immunity as going to subject matter jurisdiction.285  Others 
have mistakenly cited Samantar itself for this proposition.286  It is true that, 
in describing pre-FSIA practice, Samantar recounted that when the State 
Department issued a suggestion of immunity, “the district court surrendered 
its jurisdiction.”287  But Samantar never characterized the jurisdiction 
surrendered as subject matter jurisdiction, and the two cases that it cited both 
involved in rem jurisdiction over seized vessels—a form of personal 
jurisdiction.288  As a general matter, pre-FSIA cases did not treat either 
foreign state immunity or foreign official immunity as a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  The FSIA characterized it as such in order to permit 
claims against foreign states to be brought in and removed to federal courts.  
But Samantar’s holding that the FSIA’s jurisdictional provisions do not 
apply to claims against foreign officials means that the decision to treat 
foreign official immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction cannot 
rest on the same basis.289 
Characterizing foreign official immunity as subject matter jurisdiction is 
also inconsistent with common understandings of how subject matter 
jurisdiction works with respect to federal courts, state courts, and litigants.  
First, it is well established that “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower 
federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction”290 and that federal courts have a 
“virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction that Congress 
has given them.291  Allowing federal courts to create exceptions to subject 
matter jurisdiction by developing rules of federal common law is inconsistent 
with congressional control.  Although the Supreme Court has allowed federal 
courts to decline jurisdiction in favor of state courts under a limited number 
of abstention doctrines292 and in favor of foreign courts under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens,293 it has not treated immunity from suit as 
jurisdictional without direction from Congress.294 
Second, characterizing foreign official immunity as subject matter 
jurisdiction makes it difficult to explain how these rules bind state courts.  
State courts are courts of general subject matter jurisdiction that can hear all 
categories of claims, and such limits as exist on the subject matter jurisdiction 
of state courts are imposed by state law.  Federal statutes sometimes limit the 
 
 285. See, e.g., Eliahu, 919 F.3d at 712 (citing Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 
2009)); Doe 1 v. Buratai, 318 F. Supp. 3d 218, 226 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Belhas v. Ya’alon, 
515 F.3d 1279, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
 286. Miango, 2019 WL 2191806, at *2. 
 287. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010). 
 288. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 
578, 588 (1943). 
 289. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 
GEO. L.J. 1825, 1851 (2018) (noting that “there is no federal statute conferring or withholding 
subject matter jurisdiction on or from the federal courts based on an individual immunity 
determination”). 
 290. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004). 
 291. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
 292. See id. at 813–17 (describing abstention doctrines). 
 293. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 294. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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subject matter jurisdiction of state courts indirectly by giving federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over claims under those statutes.  But federal 
common-law rules of immunity are trans-substantive and apply to all claims, 
even claims under state and foreign law.  Foreign official immunity fits better 
into the federal scheme if treated as an affirmative defense.  The act of state 
doctrine provides a useful comparison.  Like foreign official immunity, it is 
a rule of federal common law that is binding on state courts,295 and it provides 
“a substantive defense on the merits” when raised by a defendant.296 
Third, foreign official immunity can be waived,297 whereas limitations on 
subject matter jurisdiction generally cannot be waived.298  It is true that, 
under the FSIA, a foreign state’s waiver of immunity allows the exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  But that is because of the FSIA’s peculiar 
structure:  it grants subject matter jurisdiction over any action with respect to 
which a foreign state is not immune,299 and a foreign state is not immune if 
it has waived its immunity.300  Outside the FSIA framework, treating 
immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction implies that a party can 
directly waive a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction, which parties are 
not ordinarily able to do. 
There is some precedent for treating foreign official immunity as a 
question of personal jurisdiction.  Pre-FSIA admiralty cases tended to treat 
foreign state immunity as going to personal jurisdiction, as did the State 
Department’s determinations of immunity between 1952 and 1976.301  Some 
pre-Samantar cases also treated doctrines of foreign official immunity as 
depriving the court of personal jurisdiction.302  And the fact that foreign 
official immunity can be waived presents no difficulty under this approach 
because a defendant can consent to personal jurisdiction.303  Limits on 
personal jurisdiction by federal courts, however, are typically found in rules, 
statutes, and interpretations of the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, not in 
federal common law.  Characterizing foreign official immunity as depriving 
a court of personal jurisdiction would be particularly problematic with 
respect to state courts.  The Supreme Court has long based its authority to 
 
 295. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426–27 (1964); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 441 cmt. 
b (AM. L. INST. 2018) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)] (“The act of state doctrine 
constitutes federal common law that . . . overrides any contrary rule of State law.”). 
 296. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).  Unlike foreign official 
immunity, the act of state doctrine may also be invoked by a plaintiff seeking recognition of 
foreign laws. See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398 (recognizing Cuban expropriation). 
 297. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 298. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
 299. 28 U.S.C. § 1330. 
 300. Id. § 1605(a)(1); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 295, § 421 reporters’ 
note 2 (discussing waiver under the FSIA in relation to subject matter jurisdiction). 
 301. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 302. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“A 
head-of-state recognized by the United States government is absolutely immune from personal 
jurisdiction in United States courts unless that immunity has been waived by statute or by the 
foreign government recognized by the United States.”). 
 303. See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 703. 
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review the exercise of personal jurisdiction by state courts exclusively in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,304 and it has disclaimed 
authority to impose other jurisdictional limits.305 
The best way of characterizing foreign official immunity is as an 
affirmative defense.  As noted above, this is how courts treated claims of 
conduct-based immunity during the early years of the republic, and at least 
some courts characterized sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense 
during the pre-FSIA period.306  Indeed, this is precisely how a State 
Department guide for law enforcement treats the conduct-based immunity of 
consular officers today.307  Treating foreign official immunity as an 
affirmative defense is consistent with the proposition that it can be waived.  
It is also consistent with the way courts have treated other rules of federal 
common law, such as the act of state doctrine.308  Indeed, it might be the only 
way to explain how the federal common law rules of foreign official 
immunity bind state courts, because rules of federal common law generally 
do not limit either the personal or the subject matter jurisdiction of state 
courts.  The argument for treating foreign official immunity as an affirmative 
defense also finds support in an analogy to domestic official immunity, which 
is an affirmative defense under federal law.309 
Foreign official immunity provides protection against the burdens of 
litigation and not just against liability.  But treating such immunity as an 
affirmative defense still permits a court to decide the question at the outset 
of the proceedings.  Although defendants often raise affirmative defenses in 
their answers,310 such defenses can instead be raised in a motion to dismiss 
or a motion for summary judgment before filing an answer.311  “This is 
especially true as to those affirmative defenses that seem likely to dispose of 
the entire case or a significant portion of the case,” as does foreign official 
immunity.312  As discussed below, discovery, if any, may be limited to what 
is necessary to decide the question of immunity.313 
 
 304. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) (“It 
has long been established that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of 
state courts.”). 
 305. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 n.7 
(1984) (disclaiming authority to review interpretation of state long-arm statute); cf. Am. 
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 457 (1994) (holding that federal doctrine of forum non 
conveniens “is not applicable to the States”). 
 306. See, e.g., Chem. Nat. Res., Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864, 867 (Pa. 
1966) (“Sovereign Immunity is in the nature of an affirmative defense . . . .”). 
 307. See STATE DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 154, at 11, 22. 
 308. See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (holding that qualified immunity 
“is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official”). 
 310. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 311. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1277 (3d ed. 2021); cf. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (indicating that the qualified 
immunity of domestic officials may be decided on motion for summary judgment). 
 312. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 311, § 1277. 
 313. See infra notes 348–52 and accompanying text. 
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Treating foreign official immunity as an affirmative defense would make 
it a merits question.  This means that a federal court would have to determine 
that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim and personal jurisdiction 
over the parties before addressing immunity.314  But in suits against foreign 
officials, questions of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are 
generally straightforward,315 and in many cases they provide alternative 
grounds for dismissal that ought to be addressed first in any event.316  
Treating foreign official immunity as an affirmative defense would also 
modestly increase the preclusive effect of a judgment granting immunity.  A 
federal court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction precludes the 
plaintiff from bringing the same claim again in federal court but not in state 
court.317  A federal court’s dismissal based on an affirmative defense of 
foreign official immunity would additionally preclude the plaintiff from 
bringing the same claim in state court.  If dismissal is based on a current 
official’s status-based immunity, then the plaintiff could attempt to serve the 
official once that official is no longer in office and argue that the earlier 
judgment is not preclusive because the underlying facts have changed.318  If 
dismissal is based on conduct-based immunity, then it should be conclusive 
on the matter. 
Finally, treating foreign official immunity as an affirmative defense would 
not increase the risk of a default judgment or the risk that the official might 
inadvertently waive immunity by not raising it.  This sometimes happens 
even now, when foreign official immunity is treated as a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction, but federal courts have been willing to grant relief from 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) when this occurs.319  
Although Rule 60(b)(4) is limited to situations where the judgment is void 
(for example, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), Rule 60(b)(6) allows a 
court to grant relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies 
 
 314. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007) 
(noting that “a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first 
determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter 
jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction)”). 
 315. As noted above, courts will generally lack personal jurisdiction over foreign officials 
unless the cause of action arose in the United States or the official can be served with process 
here. See supra notes 279–80 and accompanying text. 
 316. See infra notes 353–67 and accompanying text.  As explained below, because 
international law is agnostic about the details of how states implement their international legal 
obligations, dismissal on these threshold grounds would comply with the United States’s 
obligation to shield foreign officials from the burdens of litigation, where such an obligation 
clearly exists. See infra notes 325–28 and accompanying text. 
 317. See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 311, § 4436 (“The judgment remains effective 
to preclude relitigation of the precise issue of jurisdiction or venue that led to the initial 
dismissal.”). 
 318. Because status-based immunity lasts only as long as the official holds office, dismissal 
on such grounds would not bar the plaintiff from refiling once the immunity has ended. See 
id. § 4437 (“In ordinary circumstances a second action on the same claim is not precluded by 
dismissal of a first action for prematurity or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit.”). 
 319. See, e.g., Miango v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-1265, 2019 WL 
2191806, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2019) (granting relief from default judgment on grounds of 
head-of-state immunity). 
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relief.”320  Courts have relied on this provision to grant relief from judgment 
to domestic officials based on qualified immunity,321 and it would seem to 
be equally available to foreign officials.  It is important to recall that the 
immunity of foreign officials ultimately belongs to their states.322  When a 
foreign official is sued, a U.S. court should, if possible, give notice to the 
foreign state or require the plaintiff to do so in order to afford the foreign 
state an opportunity to assert or waive immunity.  But when the foreign state 
learns of a suit only after final judgment, Rule 60(b) should allow the foreign 
state to have the judgment set aside by asserting the immunity of its 
official.323  Finally, decisions on foreign official immunity should be 
immediately appealable but, as discussed further below, treating the question 
as an affirmative defense would not prevent this.324 
Customary international law clearly requires the United States to recognize 
the immunity of foreign officials in at least some instances.  However, 
international law does not dictate how such immunity is implemented in the 
U.S. legal system so long as immunity is treated as a threshold question.  As 
a general matter, “international law does not itself prescribe how it should be 
applied or enforced at the national level.”325  In international law, immunity 
from suit is often referred to as “immunity from jurisdiction,” but only to 
distinguish it from “immunity from enforcement,” which is governed by 
different, and more stringent, international law rules.326  Addressing state 
immunity in Jurisdictional Immunities, the ICJ observed: 
Immunity from jurisdiction is an immunity not merely from being 
subjected to an adverse judgment but from being subjected to the trial 
process.  It is, therefore, necessarily preliminary in nature.  Consequently, 
a national court is required to determine whether or not a foreign State is 
entitled to immunity as a matter of international law before it can hear the 
merits of the case brought before it and before the facts have been 
established.327 
 
 320. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6); see also 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 311, § 2864 
(discussing Rule 60(b)(6)). 
 321. See, e.g., Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming a jury’s finding 
that a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity). 
 322. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 323. Both the VCDR and the VCCR require that a foreign state’s waiver of diplomatic and 
consular immunity be “express.” VCDR, supra note 22, art. 32(2); VCCR, supra note 22, art. 
45(2).  But the State Department does not appear to view these provisions as a bar to treating 
foreign official immunity as an affirmative defense, since it explicitly advises law enforcement 
officials to treat consular immunity that way. See STATE DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 
154, at 11, 22. 
 324. See infra notes 379–88 and accompanying text. 
 325. Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and National Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 423, 423 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 102, § 111 cmt. h (“In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily 
for the United States to decide how it will carry out its international obligations.”). 
 326. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, 
¶ 113 (Feb. 3) (distinguishing immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from enforcement). 
 327. Id. ¶ 82.  Although the customary international law governing foreign official 
immunity will not always be the same as the customary international law governing foreign 
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As long as a foreign official can raise a claim of immunity at the outset 
and avoid having to bear the burdens of litigation, customary international 
law is indifferent about how domestic procedural law characterizes the 
question of immunity.  The U.S. executive branch has avoided taking a 
position in legal filings on how foreign official immunity should be 
characterized for pleading purposes, noting simply that “[f]oreign official 
immunity, like foreign state immunity, is a threshold question.”328  Yet even 
though state immunity is a “threshold question” under the FSIA, the foreign 
state must still appear and contest the application of an enumerated exception 
to immunity, and occasionally submit to limited jurisdictional discovery if 
relevant facts are disputed.  It is not unreasonable, or inconsistent with the 
United States’s international legal obligations, to expect foreign officials to 
do the same. 
In sum, the reasons for treating foreign state immunity as a question of 
subject matter jurisdiction do not apply to foreign official immunity.  It 
makes more sense to characterize the immunity of foreign officials as an 
affirmative defense, similar to courts’ treatment of domestic official 
immunity.  Procedurally, foreign official immunity can still be treated as a 
threshold issue, a ground for relief from a final judgment, and a question that 
is immediately appealable, as it is now.  But treating foreign official 
immunity as an affirmative defense would affect the burden of proof, as the 
next part discusses. 
C.  Proving Immunity 
It is one thing to plead immunity and another thing to prove it.  
Status-based immunity rarely requires complex factual determinations.  For 
example, head-of-state immunity turns on a single fact—the defendant’s 
status as head of state, head of government, or foreign minister—and the 
executive has unreviewable authority to determine whom the United States 
recognizes as holding those offices.  Diplomatic immunity also turns 
primarily on the defendant’s status as a diplomatic agent, which is also a 
question for the executive, although some exceptions to diplomatic immunity 
may require the determination of other facts. 
Conduct-based immunity determinations can sometimes be more factually 
complicated, which raises both substantive and procedural questions.  As we 
have seen, such immunity requires determining whether the suit is based on 
actions taken in the defendant’s official capacity, which can involve 
questions of foreign law and international law, as well as disputed questions 
of fact.  Foreign governments may assert that officials were acting within 
their official capacity, raising questions of the weight to be given to such 
assertions.  The State Department might suggest conduct-based immunity.  
And sometimes discovery will be needed to answer factual questions relevant 
 
state immunity, both appear to treat it as immunity from suit and therefore as a preliminary 
question. 
 328. Statement of Interest Submitted by the United States of America at 9, Miango v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-1265, 2020 WL 3498586 (D.D.C. June 29, 2020). 
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to the immunity determination.  This part considers each of these questions 
about how to prove conduct-based immunity. 
1.  Burdens of Proof 
Federal courts have struggled with how to allocate the burden of proof on 
questions of foreign official immunity.  Although the D.C. Circuit treats 
foreign official immunity as a question of subject matter jurisdiction, it has 
held that the defendant bears the burden of proof.329  The court borrowed this 
burden-shifting approach from the FSIA, based on that statute’s legislative 
history.330  The Second Circuit has criticized this borrowing, noting correctly 
that “common law foreign-official immunity is distinct from FSIA immunity 
and predates the FSIA.”331  The Second Circuit went on to hold that the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant lacks immunity, at 
least when the defendant claims diplomatic immunity.332 
Generally, the party invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the 
burden of alleging and proving facts sufficient to support it.333  If, on the 
other hand, foreign official immunity is characterized as an affirmative 
defense, the burden of proof would lie with the defendant.334  This is how 
federal law treats the qualified immunity of domestic officials.335  Requiring 
foreign officials to demonstrate their entitlement to foreign official immunity 
also makes practical sense.  For status-based immunity, the burden is 
minimal because the defendants must simply show that they hold offices that 
are entitled to such immunity.336  Conduct-based immunity may be more 
fact-dependent, but foreign officials are likely to have better access to 
relevant facts about the capacity in which they were acting, the content of 
foreign law, and the views of their own governments. 
 
 329. Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d 142, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 330. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6616 
(characterizing foreign state immunity as “an affirmative defense” and stating that “[t]he 
ultimate burden of proving immunity would rest with the foreign state”); see also Gould, Inc. 
v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing legislative history in 
support of burden shifting). 
 331. Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 444 n.6 (2d Cir. 2019).  The U.S. 
government has argued that the burden-shifting approach is mistaken, even with respect to 
questions of state immunity under the FSIA. See Broidy Letter Brief, supra note 202, at 17 
(“That snippet of legislative history is inconsistent with the text of the FSIA.”). 
 332. Broidy, 944 F.3d at 444. 
 333. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); McNutt 
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936). 
 334. If foreign official immunity were treated as a question of personal jurisdiction, it is 
not entirely clear where the burden of proof would lie.  With respect to the constitutional 
requirements of minimum contacts and reasonableness, courts have generally held that the 
burden is on the plaintiff, but the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the exercise 
of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. See, e.g., M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air 
Ltda., 890 F.3d 995, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 
F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 335. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (“Qualified or ‘good faith’ 
immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.” (quoting 
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 (1980))). 
 336. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Determinations by the United States and by Foreign Governments 
No matter who bears the burden of proof, whether foreign officials are 
entitled to immunity often turns on questions of fact.  Sometimes the U.S. 
executive branch or foreign governments will express views on those facts, 
and sometimes discovery will be necessary.  This part discusses how courts 
should treat factual submissions by the United States and foreign 
governments, and the following part turns to discovery. 
As discussed in Part III, it is well established that executive branch 
suggestions of head-of-state immunity are controlling because the executive 
has constitutional authority to determine who holds these offices.  Diplomatic 
immunity also turns largely on a person’s status.  However, the Vienna 
Convention creates exceptions to a diplomatic agent’s immunity from civil 
suits for actions relating to real property, actions relating to succession, and 
actions relating “to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the 
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.”337  
Applying these exceptions may require jurisdictional discovery, which the 
district court has authority to grant.338 
Conduct-based immunity for acts taken in an “official capacity” will often 
turn on factual determinations beyond the defendant’s status.  Whether 
foreign officials were acting within the scope of their authority depends in 
part on foreign law.  The State Department has no special expertise in 
interpreting or applying foreign law.  Foreign governments obviously do 
have expertise with respect to their own laws but may be tempted to bend the 
interpretation to shield their officials from suit in the United States.  As noted 
above, U.S. courts “should accord respectful consideration to a foreign 
government’s submission,”339 but the ultimate determination of what foreign 
law permits remains a question for the court.  Foreign officials would not be 
entitled to conduct-based immunity for acts that exceeded their authority 
under foreign law. 
Finally, whether a foreign official was acting in an official capacity may 
depend on the facts of the particular case.  Generally speaking, courts are in 
a better position to resolve factual questions than the State Department or 
foreign governments are,340 as the State Department appears to recognize.  
For example, in one recent case, plaintiffs who were protesting outside the 
Washington, D.C., hotel of the Congolese president brought suit against the 
president and several Congolese officials, alleging that they had been beaten 
and robbed by those officials.341  After entry of a default judgment, the 
 
 337. VCDR, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(c). 
 338. See Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Benomar, 944 F.3d 436, 445–47 (2d Cir. 2019).  
Jurisdictional discovery is discussed below in Part IV.B.4. 
 339. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (2018). 
 340. For claims that arise abroad, the foreign government might have better access to the 
facts, but it will often have an incentive not to disclose them. Cf. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc., 138 
S. Ct. at 1873 (noting that when a foreign government “offers an account in the context of 
litigation, there may be cause for caution in evaluating the foreign government’s submission”). 
 341. Miango v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-1265, 2020 WL 3498586, at 
*1–2 (D.D.C. June 29, 2020). 
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United States filed a suggestion of immunity for Congo’s president as 
head-of-state,342 and the district court vacated the judgment against him.343  
Subsequently, the United States filed a statement of interest with respect to 
the other Congolese officials.344  The State Department determined that the 
foreign officials were not entitled to diplomatic immunity,345 but that further 
factual development was necessary to determine whether the officials were 
entitled to conduct-based immunity.346  The State Department did not attempt 
to determine the facts for itself, suggesting instead that the district court 
should engage in limited discovery relevant to the question of immunity.347 
3.  Discovery 
Sometimes discovery may be needed to determine facts relevant to foreign 
official immunity, even though such immunity is properly treated as a 
threshold matter.  This is true regardless of whether such immunity is 
characterized as an affirmative defense or as a question of personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction.  It has long been established that “discovery is available 
to ascertain the facts bearing on [jurisdictional] issues.”348 
The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the availability of limited 
jurisdictional discovery in the context of foreign state immunity under the 
FSIA.349  The United States has argued with respect to discovery that “[t]he 
same principle applies to factual questions controlling a foreign official’s 
immunity from suit.”350  One can seek guidance from the case law on 
discovery from foreign states without risking the fallacy of inappropriate 
borrowing from an inapplicable statute.  That is because, with the exception 
of one limited provision, the FSIA simply does not address discovery.351 
In cases against foreign states, lower courts have held that discovery 
“should be ordered circumspectly and only to verify allegations of specific 
facts crucial to an immunity determination.”352  Since both foreign state 
immunity and foreign official immunity serve the purpose of protecting the 
 
 342. U.S. Miango Suggestion, supra note 122. 
 343. Miango v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-1265, 2019 WL 2191806, at *2 
(D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2019). 
 344. Statement of Interest Submitted by the United States of America, Miango v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, No. 15-1265, 2020 WL 3498586 (D.D.C. June 29, 2020) 
[hereinafter U.S. Miango Statement]. 
 345. Id. at 4–7. 
 346. Id. at 9. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978). 
 349. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 
1312, 1316–17 (2017) (noting that “where jurisdictional questions turn upon further factual 
development, the trial judge may take evidence and resolve relevant factual disputes”). 
 350. U.S. Miango Statement, supra note 344, at 9. 
 351. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Cap., Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 142–43 (2014). 
 352. Packsys, S.A. de C.V. v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 899 F.3d 1081, 1094 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (quoting Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v. Nippon Hoso Kyokai, 199 F.3d 1078, 1088 
(9th Cir. 1999)); see also Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 839 F.3d 193, 206–07 
(2d Cir. 2016) (similar); Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(similar). 
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defendant from the burdens of litigation, it seems appropriate that the same 
approach should apply in cases against foreign officials.  Whether foreign 
official immunity is characterized as jurisdictional or as an affirmative 
defense, it remains a threshold issue, and the district court should limit 
discovery to what is necessary to decide the immunity question. 
D.  Alternative Grounds for Dismissal 
Because questions of foreign official immunity sometimes involve 
difficult questions of fact or law, courts should also consider alternative 
grounds for dismissal.353  In a pre-Samantar case applying the FSIA to a suit 
against foreign officials, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred by 
failing to consider “other potentially dispositive jurisdictional defenses.”354  
The Court of Appeals observed: 
[P]rimacy of immunity values need not imply priority of immunity 
determination.  Immunity should reduce the expenses, in time and 
inconvenience, imposed on foreign sovereigns by litigation in U.S. courts.  
If one (or more) of the other jurisdictional defenses hold out the promise of 
being cheaply decisive, and the defendant wants it decided first, it may well 
be best to grapple with it (or them) first.  It would be bizarre if an assertion 
of immunity worked to increase litigation costs via jurisdictional discovery, 
to the neglect of swifter routes to dismissal.355 
During the period between the Tate Letter in 1952 and enactment of the 
FSIA in 1976, the State Department “generally refused to decide immunity 
claims while [other] jurisdictional defenses remained to be decided by the 
court,”356 even if the foreign country wanted the State Department to 
prioritize its request for a suggestion of immunity.  Although today the State 
Department does not insist that courts decide such defenses first in foreign 
official immunity cases, it has noted in recent filings that “a court need not 
address the immunity question until it has first reached determinations on 
 
 353. See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar:  A United States 
Government Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1158–59 (2011) (identifying 
category of “‘non-Samantar procedural cases,’ in which the issue of foreign official immunity 
is not squarely presented because of a threshold flaw such as lack of personal jurisdiction, 
improper service of process, forum non conveniens, the absence of necessary parties, or 
because the official is not the real party in interest”); see also Bellinger & Wirth, supra note 
126, at 466 (noting that dismissal on alternative grounds “conserves [State Department] 
resources”). 
 354. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Sovereign Immunity Decisions, supra note 52, at 1019; see, e.g., id. at 1072 (reporting 
that in Pacheo Ruiz v. Air France, “[t]he Department declined action pending resolution by 
the court of a question of sufficiency of service”); id. at 1073 (reporting that in Soobitsky v. 
Ger. Fed. R.R., “[t]he Department declined to make a decision pending resolution of a defense 
of insufficient service of process”); id. at 1074 (reporting that in Granados v. Linea Aeropostal 
Venezolava, “[t]he Department declined action pending the resolution of certain outstanding 
jurisdictional issues by the court”). 
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other threshold issues, including whether a foreign official defendant has 
been properly served and whether the court has personal jurisdiction.”357 
A number of alternative grounds for dismissal are available regardless of 
whether foreign official immunity is characterized as a question of subject 
matter or personal jurisdiction or as an affirmative defense.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Sinochem that “a federal court has leeway ‘to choose 
among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.’”358  
A federal court is thus free to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without 
reaching the question of subject matter jurisdiction.359  And a federal court 
is free to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens without reaching 
either subject matter or personal jurisdiction.360  Even though most federal 
courts today treat foreign official immunity as a question of subject matter 
jurisdiction, a large number of decisions have either dismissed claims against 
foreign officials on alternative grounds without reaching the question of 
immunity361 or have noted the availability of alternative grounds in addition 
to immunity.362 
A good example is Chen v. Shi.363  There, Chinese members of the Falun 
Gong movement residing in the United States brought human rights claims 
against a Chinese official under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the TVPA.  
The plaintiffs moved for default judgment when the defendant, who was still 
 
 357. Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 
3 n.2, Savang v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 16-02037 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2018).  
The U.S. reference to personal jurisdiction here refers to rules other than immunity. 
 358. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)). 
 359. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 578. 
 360. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 432. 
 361. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Buratai, 792 F. App’x 6, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (affirming 
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction); Doe 1 v. Buratai, No. 18-7170, 2019 WL 668339, 
at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2019) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction); RSM 
Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 387 F. App’x 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming for failure to state a 
claim); Sequeira v. Republic of Nicaragua, No. 16-25052, 2017 WL 8772507, at *11 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 1, 2017) (dismissing for lack of diversity jurisdiction); Kaldawi v. State of Kuwait, 
No. 14-07316, 2017 WL 6017293, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) (declining to enter default 
judgment because of lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient pleading); S.K. Innovation, 
Inc. v. Finpol, 854 F. Supp. 2d 99, 118 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying leave to amend because 
proposed amended complaint did not establish personal jurisdiction); Habyarimana v. 
Kagame, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (setting aside default judgment 
against head of state for failure to serve process before the State Department had made a 
suggestion of immunity); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
 362. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Buratai, 318 F. Supp. 3d 218, 230 (D.D.C. 2018) (dismissing for 
lack of personal jurisdiction); Newman v. Jewish Agency for Isr., No. 16-7593, 2017 WL 
6628616, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2017) (noting lack of personal jurisdiction as an additional 
ground for dismissal); Omari v. Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone Auth., No. 16–3895, 2017 
WL 3896399, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017) (dismissing certain claims for failure to state a 
claim before addressing immunity); Mireskandari v. Mayne, No. 12-3861, 2016 WL 1165896, 
at *20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2016) (noting lack of personal jurisdiction as alternative ground for 
dismissal); Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, No. 12–1415, 2013 WL 3006338, at *6 n.4 (D. Or. 
June 11, 2013) (noting lack of personal jurisdiction as alternative ground for dismissal). 
 363. No. 09-8920, 2013 WL 3963735 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013). 
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in China, failed to appear.364  Although the district court invited the State 
Department to express its views on foreign official immunity, the 
Department declined to do so.365  Rather than determine the question of 
foreign official immunity, which would have required the court to address 
factual questions, as well as whether conduct-based immunity extends to 
human rights violations, the court dismissed all the claims for lack of 
personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute366 and the ATS 
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kiobel.367  Because those grounds provided simpler, dispositive 
grounds for dismissal, there was no need for the court to reach the more 
complicated question of immunity. 
If foreign official immunity is characterized as an affirmative defense, an 
important, additional ground for dismissal becomes available:  that the 
plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.368  To be 
clear, the question here is not whether the plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
because the foreign official is entitled to immunity369 but rather whether the 
plaintiff has failed to state a claim even if the foreign official were not entitled 
to immunity.  Under the pleading standard adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Twombly370 and Iqbal,371 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’”372  Some complaints against foreign officials 
contain no more than “conclusory statements” and fail to establish a plausible 
claim under applicable law.373  In such cases, dismissal for failure to state a 
claim may be the simplest ground on which to dispose of a case. 
For example, it appears from the State Department’s submission that the 
claims in Doğan v. Barak374 against a former Israeli defense minister for 
torture and extrajudicial killing during the interception of the Gaza Freedom 
Flotilla by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in 2010 could have been dismissed 
for failure to state a claim without reaching the question of foreign official 
 
 364. Id. at *1. 
 365. Id. at *3. 
 366. Id. at *4–5. 
 367. Id. at *7. 
 368. A few decisions have dismissed suits against foreign officials for failure to state a 
claim but without considering how foreign official immunity should be characterized. See, 
e.g., RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 387 F. App’x 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2010); Omari v. Ras Al 
Khaimah Free Trade Zone Auth., No. 16-3895, 2017 WL 3896399, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 
2017); Kaldawi v. State of Kuwait, No. 14-07316, 2017 WL 6017293, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
17, 2017). 
 369. As noted above, foreign official immunity can be raised on a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim or on a motion for summary judgment before filing an answer, even if 
it is treated as an affirmative defense. See supra notes 310–11 and accompanying text. 
 370. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 371. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 372. Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 373. Id.  As Professor Arthur Miller has observed, Twombly and Iqbal “ignore the reality 
that at the outset of many cases there is a significant information asymmetry between plaintiffs 
and defendants, typically favoring defendants.” Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For?:  
Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold Standard?, 78 LA. L. REV. 739, 751 (2018). 
 374. 932 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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immunity.  The State Department’s suggestion of immunity indicated that 
“[t]he [c]omplaint . . . d[id] not allege any conduct by former Defense 
Minister Barak in the events leading to Doğan’s death beyond his general 
participation in the planning of the interception of the flotilla and his issuance 
of unspecified orders to the IDF forces who intercepted it.”375  The district 
court could have concluded that the alleged link between Barak’s decisions 
and the death of civilians on board the Mavi Marmara was too attenuated to 
state a plausible claim for relief under applicable law.376  By dismissing on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) grounds rather than immunity 
grounds, courts can also avoid creating overly expansive immunity doctrines 
that could erode plaintiffs’ ability to seek relief in other cases. 
Failure to state a claim is a threshold ground for dismissal that spares the 
defendant the burden of litigation.  But it is also a decision on the merits,377 
and “a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without 
first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit 
(subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction).”378  Only 
if foreign official immunity is considered an affirmative defense is dismissal 
for failure to state a claim a viable alternative to dismissal on immunity 
grounds, although a court would have to determine that it had personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction before considering the sufficiency of the 
complaint. 
E.  Appealing Immunity Decisions 
Decisions on foreign official immunity should be immediately appealable, 
regardless of whether such immunity is characterized as an affirmative 
defense or as a question of personal or subject matter jurisdiction.  Decisions 
granting immunity are appealable as final decisions of the district court.379  
Decisions denying immunity are not final decisions.  But because foreign 
official immunity is an immunity not only from liability but also from the 
burdens of trial, immediate appealability is necessary to ensure that immunity 
performs its intended function. 
Under the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
small class of prejudgment orders that “are immediately appealable because 
 
 375. Doğan Letter, supra note 221, at 1. 
 376. See Yuval Shany & Keren R. Michaeli, The Case Against Ariel Sharon:  Revisiting 
the Doctrine of Command Responsibility, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 797, 816–67 (2002) 
(discussing command responsibility under international law).  The claims against former 
Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo for the 1997 massacre of villagers in Chiapas, Mexico, by 
paramilitary groups might similarly have been dismissed for failure to state a claim. See 
Zedillo Letter, supra note 158, at 2 (noting “the generalized allegations in the instant 
complaint”). 
 377. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (“The dismissal 
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on 
the merits.’”). 
 378. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007); see 
also In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 151 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 379. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from 
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). 
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they ‘finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent 
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the 
whole case is adjudicated.’”380  The federal courts of appeals have held that 
orders denying foreign state immunity under the FSIA are immediately 
appealable.381  Because foreign state immunity “is an immunity from suit 
rather than a mere defense to liability[,] it is effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial.”382  The Fourth Circuit has applied the 
same reasoning to decisions denying foreign official immunity.383 
How foreign official immunity is characterized should not affect this 
result.  If foreign official immunity is characterized as a question of personal 
or subject matter jurisdiction, it should be immediately appealable because 
these questions are separate from the merits.  But even if foreign official 
immunity were considered an affirmative defense, it should still be 
immediately appealable.  Courts may look for guidance on this question to 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of qualified immunity.  In Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald,384 the Supreme Court held that qualified immunity “is an 
affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”385  But in 
Mitchell v. Forsyth,386 the Court went on to hold “that a district court’s denial 
of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, 
is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.”387  This is so because 
qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other 
burdens of litigation.”388  The same reasoning applies to foreign official 
immunity as an affirmative defense.  Thus, no matter how foreign official 
immunity is characterized for pleading purposes, decisions granting or 
denying such immunity should be immediately appealable. 
 
 380. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
 381. See, e.g., Frank v. Commonwealth of Antigua & Barbuda, 842 F.3d 362, 366–67 (5th 
Cir. 2016); O’Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2009); Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 
461 F.3d 461, 467 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic 
Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 576 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989); Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v. 
Cent. Dist. of Cal., 859 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 
 382. Compania Mexicana, 859 F.2d at 1358; see also Rush-Presbyterian, 877 F.2d at 576 
n.2 (“Since sovereign immunity is an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens of 
litigation, and not just a defense to liability on the merits, the denial of a claim of sovereign 
immunity is an immediately appealable interlocutory order . . . .”). 
 383. See Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin, No. 20-7040, 2021 WL 3950185, at *5 (D.C. 
Cir. Sept. 3, 2021); Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 2016); Yousuf v. Samantar, 
699 F.3d 763, 768 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Farhang v. Indian Inst. of Tech., 655 F. App’x 
569, 570 (9th Cir. 2016) (allowing appeal of foreign official immunity determination under 
the collateral order doctrine without discussion). 
 384. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 385. Id. at 815. 
 386. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
 387. Id. at 530. 
 388. Id. at 526. 
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CONCLUSION 
Samantar’s holding that the FSIA does not apply to foreign officials tore 
up the map that many courts had been following.  And in the decade since, 
U.S. courts have struggled to find their way.  But, as this Article has shown, 
there are answers to the questions that courts face in suits against foreign 
officials, even without a statute and without blindly following the executive’s 
lead. 
The substantive law of status-based immunity is relatively clear.  Heads of 
state, heads of government, and foreign ministers are absolutely immune 
from suit during their tenure in office.  Under the relevant treaties, diplomats 
are also entitled to nearly absolute immunity, whereas consuls are entitled to 
immunity for their official acts.  Other foreign officials, as well as former 
officials, are entitled to immunity for acts taken in their “official capacity.”  
In developing the federal common law of foreign official conduct-based 
immunity in the absence of an applicable statute or treaty, courts should listen 
carefully to the views of the executive branch.  But unless the question 
involves a foreign official’s status, courts are not bound to follow the 
executive’s case-specific suggestions or its articulation of general principles 
governing immunity determinations. 
There are also clear answers to the procedural questions raised by these 
cases.  The familiar rules for service of process, personal jurisdiction, and 
subject matter jurisdiction apply in suits against foreign officials.  Foreign 
official immunity should be treated as an affirmative defense, with the burden 
of proof on the official claiming immunity.  The official’s scope of authority 
under foreign law is a question of law for the court, just like any other 
question of foreign law.  When immunity turns on questions of fact, a court 
may permit limited discovery.  If it appears that the case should be dismissed 
on other grounds—such as lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, 
forum non conveniens, or failure to state a claim—courts should address 
those grounds first and avoid the question of immunity in order to shield the 
foreign official from the burdens of suit to the greatest extent possible.  And 
when a court reaches the question of immunity and denies the foreign 
official’s claim, that decision should be immediately appealable to spare the 
official from having to litigate liability before the immunity claim is resolved 
definitively. 
Congress can certainly address foreign official conduct-based immunity in 
a statute, as it has done for other forms of immunity.  Such legislation could 
answer both substantive and procedural questions, providing clear directions 
for courts to follow.  But until Congress enacts such a statute, courts can still 
find their way with a proper roadmap. 
